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Abstract
Reliability has become ever important. Unfortunately, software errors continue to be frequent
and account for the major causes of system failures. Further, detecting and fixing bugs is one
of the most time-consuming and difficult tasks in software development. In order to facilitate
the procedure, it would be highly beneficial if we can first analyze and understand the bug
characteristics, and then detect the bugs automatically. The huge amount of analysis data
in large software such as source code and documents, however, renders a tedious and difficult
task on developers to analyze them.
This dissertation proposes a novel approach that applies data mining techniques to ex-
tract information in large software and exploit such extracted information for bug detection.
Thanks to the distinguished characteristics in data mining that can efficiently handle a huge
amount of data, this approach can also efficiently discover useful information from large
software code and documents.
To understand the bug characteristics, this dissertation studies them from bug databases
for two large and popular open source projects. The bug databases contain more than
300,000 bug reports, which is impossible to study all of them manually. In order to extract
useful information from such a huge amount of data, this dissertation proposes applying text
classification and information retrieval techniques to automatically classify the bugs from dif-
ferent dimensions, namely root causes, impacts, and software components. The study shows
that this approach can help developers analyze and understand bug characteristics in large
software efficiently, and facilitate testing and bug detection so as to improve reliability. Fur-
thermore, this study has discovered several new interesting findings about bug characteristics
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that can provide useful guideline for related research.
One of the findings in bug characteristic study is that semantic error is the major root
cause of bugs in modern software. Semantic bugs are application specific and so it requires
knowledge about the application to detect them. To address this problem, this dissertation
proposes using data mining technique to automatically detect software bugs. To demonstrate
this approach, this dissertation presents two automatic bug detection tools, including PR-
Miner that extracts programming rules and detects violations, and CP-Miner that detects
copy-pasted code and related bugs.
One of bug detection tools proposed in this dissertation for large software using data
mining techniques is PR-Miner. Programs usually follow many implicit programming rules,
most of which are too tedious to be documented manually by programmers. When these
rules are violated, bugs can be easily introduced. Therefore, it is highly desirable to au-
tomatically extract such rules and also to automatically detect violations. Previous work
in this direction focuses on simple function-pair-based programming rules and additionally
requires programmers to provide rule templates. PR-Miner uses frequent itemset mining
to efficiently extract implicit programming rules from large software code, requiring little
effort from programmers and no prior knowledge of the software. Benefiting from data min-
ing, PR-Miner can extract programming rules in general forms that can contain multiple
program elements of various types. In addition, this dissertation also proposes an efficient
algorithm to automatically detect violations to the extracted programming rules, which are
strong indications of bugs. The evaluation with large software code shows that PR-Miner
can efficiently extract thousands of general programming rules and detect violations within
minutes. Moreover, PR-Miner has detected many violations to the extracted rules, which
are potential bugs.
To further demonstrate the approach, this dissertation proposes another tool to identify
copy-pasted code and detect related bugs. Copy-pasted code is very common in large software
because programmers prefer reusing code via copy-paste in order to reduce programming
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effort. However, copy-pasting is prone to introducing bugs. Unfortunately, it is challenging
to efficiently identify copy-pasted code in large software. Existing copy-paste detection tools
are either not scalable to large software, or cannot handle small modifications in copy-pasted
code. Furthermore, few tools are available to detect copy-paste related bugs. In order to
address these problems, this dissertation proposes CP-Miner that uses frequent sequence
mining to efficiently identify copy-pasted code in large software, and detects copy-paste
related bugs. In order to further understand copy-paste in system software, this dissertation
also analyzes some interesting characteristics of copy-paste in Linux and FreeBSD.
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Reliability has become increasingly important, especially for server applications that require
high availability. System failures can degrade system performance, crash systems and corrupt
important data, which would significantly reduce system availability and lead to huge loss
in productivity and business. According to a report by Gartner Group the average cost of
an hour of downtime for a financial company is more than $6 million [Sco98]. Software bugs
in critical systems have caused airplane crashes, shut down nuclear reactors, and resulted in
many other disasters [Der05, Huc04].
Unfortunately, software bugs continue to be frequent. A number of studies [Gra86, Gra90,
LI92, Sco99, OGP03, OGP03, VI84] on different types of systems have shown that software
bugs are one of the major causes of system failures. For Tandem systems, Gray’s report in
1986 shows that software bugs caused 25% of system failures [Gra86]. A report in 2000 shows
that software errors account for more than 40% of system failures [MS00]. According to the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), software bugs cost the U.S. economy
about $59.5 billion annually, approximately 0.6% of the gross domestic product [Nat02]. In
order to improve software quality, most software companies put a lot of effort on software
testing and debugging. An exploratory study shows that the attempts to reduce the number
of delivered errors are estimated to account for 50–80% of the development and maintenance
effort [Ves85].
1
1.1 Characteristics of Software Bugs
To design effective tools for improving software quality requires a good understanding of
software error characteristics in representative software. Such characteristics include bug root
causes, impact, resolution time, and correlations among them. For example, if many bugs are
caused by simple typos or copying-and-pasting, software development tools can provide more
support to help detect these automatically. In testing, developers can focus on bugs based
on the severity of the impact so that resource can be utilized more effectively [RUCH99].
Many previous empirical studies, including a few classic ones [BP84, CKC91, End75,
Gla81, OW84, SC91, SC92, TLN78], have been performed more than ten years ago to under-
stand the characteristics of software bugs. For example, several researchers [End75, Gla81,
TLN78] have studied software errors occurring during software development, testing and
validation phases. Sullivan and Chillarege [SC91, SC92] analyzed error type, defect type
and error trigger distribution for shipped code of two IBM database management products
and one IBM operating system. They found that undefined state errors dominated but did
not have high impact on availability, while memory allocation errors, pointer errors, and
synchronization errors had high impact. These studies provide useful insights and guidelines
for software engineering tool designers and reliable system builders.
1.1.1 Things Have Changed
Over the last ten years, however, many factors in software development have significantly
changed. As most previous studies were conducted using old software that was developed un-
der the old development environment (e.g. without modern debugging tools) with traditional
development paradigms and software architectures, it is unclear whether their results still
apply. In addition, rising issues such as security concerns and multithread-related problems
are not well studied in previous work.
Specifically, the following changes in software and development motivate a new study
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with modern software to answer those newly rising issues as well as to provide new answers
to old questions:
• More Effective Modern Debugging Tools: In order to facilitate debugging, quite a
few bug detection tools such as Purify [HJ92] and Valgrind [NS03] have been recently
proposed and widely used. An interesting question is whether they are helpful in
minimizing the number of memory bugs in released code. To answer this question
requires a new empirical study of bugs from some modern software developed after
those debugging tools became available around 1997. If these tools become a standard
practice in software testing and validation, there should be fewer memory bugs in
modern software than that reported before for traditional software, and the diagnosis
time for these types of bugs should be much shorter than that for other types of bugs. If
the empirical results with modern software indicate otherwise, it may imply that these
tools are not effectively used by programmers due to either too many false positives or
to other reasons. Furthermore, if the major root cause of software bugs has changed,
what kind of detection tools do we need now?
• Software Architecture Shift: Due to the recent advance in hardware, many modern
computer systems, especially server systems, are all configured with multi-processors.
As a result, many software architectures are multi-threaded or multi-processed to
exploit the parallelism provided by hardware. These trends will continue especially
since, with the continuous shrinking of transistor size and increasing chip area den-
sity, multithreaded/multicore (multiple processors on one chip or CMP) architecture
is becoming a mainstream technology. For example, the Intel Pentium processor has
already provided hyper-threading and dual-core capabilities. Multicore technology is
also embraced by other chip vendors including AMD, IBM and Sun. To exploit these
technologies, increasingly more software is becoming multi-threaded. An interesting
question is whether modern software has more concurrency bugs due to this software
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architecture shift? Do these bugs cause severe impacts on systems?
• Emphasis on User-Friendly Interface: In order to provide friendly user interface,
graphical user interfaces (GUIs) have become one of the major components in many
systems. Although GUIs have become more complex and widely used, GUI testing
techniques still significantly lag behind [Mem02]. Therefore, GUI-related bugs may
have become more pervasive and dominant. Further, since GUI modules and their
development process are quite different from other modules, do they have different
root causes?
• Rising Security Concerns: Over recent years, security is becoming increasingly
important as many malicious users exploit software vulnerabilities to tamper system
integrity, steal confidential data, and make systems unavailable [Cow03, Pay02]. Un-
fortunately, previous work has not addressed how software errors affect system secu-
rity. It is unclear how many reported bugs are related to security, and what types of
security-related bugs there are, and how fast these security-related bugs are fixed.
• New Software Development Paradigm: Recently more and more software is de-
veloped using the open source paradigm that allows programmers from the Internet
to read, redistribute, and modify the source code. For quality control, most open
source software (OSS) projects usually allow only a small set of experienced develop-
ers to check code changes into the main branch of the software. The OSS development
paradigm enables software to evolve at a much faster pace. Some preliminary experi-
ences seem to indicate that this process produces better software than the traditional
closed model, in which only a few programmers can see the source and everybody
else can only use the binary code. This is why the OSS paradigm is also endorsed
by many industrial companies including IBM and Sun. For example, recently Sun’s
Solaris source code has also become open to public. An interesting question is whether
OSS actually takes a much shorter time to fix bugs.
4
1.1.2 New Findings
To understand the effects of the above new factors on software errors, it is necessary to
perform an empirical study on bugs in modern software. To this end, this dissertation
analyzes bug characteristics in two large and popular OSS projects, Mozilla and Apache Web
Server, each of which contains up to 4 million lines of code and about 90 release versions
developed over the last 8–10 years. The bugs are first classified in three dimensions, root
causes, impacts and software components. Further, this study also analyzes the statistical
correlations among these dimensions, which has never been systematically studied before.
In addition, this study also analyzes hundreds of security related bugs and concurrency bugs
in order to understand the characteristics of these emerging types of bugs.
The study on these two large projects shows that memory bugs only account for 12.2–
16.3%, much less than the 28–38% reported in previous studies [SC91, SC92], indicating
that memory bugs are becoming less pervasive due to the available techniques to automat-
ically detect them. In contrast, semantic bugs are the major root causes, accounting for
81.1–86.7%, and their percentages increases with the maturity of software. Moreover, such
semantic bugs also have severe impacts on system availability as memory related bugs, con-
tributing to 42.9–44.2% of crashes. Furthermore, it takes a longer time to diagnose and fix
semantic bugs, almost twice as memory related bugs. Our results suggest that more effort
should be put into automatically detecting and diagnosing semantic bugs.
Additionally, careless programming causes many bugs. For example, some simple bugs
such as typos account for 9.4–9.8% of semantic bugs. Although their fixes are usually simple,
it takes a longer time to diagnose them than to diagnose memory bugs, which suggests
that software development environments such as Microsoft Visual Studio and Eclipse should
provide more support to avoid them in the early stages of software development.
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1.2 Detecting Software Bugs
Identifying and fixing software bugs is one of the most time-consuming and difficult tasks to
reduce the errors in software. In order to improve programmers’ efficiency, quite a few debug-
ging techniques and tools have been proposed recently. The approaches can be classified into
two categories: dynamic checking and static checking. Some examples of dynamic tools are
Purify [HJ92], Valgrind [NS03], DIDUCE [HL02], Eraser [SBN+97], and CCured [NMW02].
They have more accurate information but can introduce overheads during execution. More-
over, most of them can only find bugs on the execution paths, so they depend on good test
cases that are usually hard to provide. In contrast, static tools, including explicit model
checking [ECC01, MPC+02, SD95] and program analysis [CLL+02, EA03, HCXE02], do not
incur any overheads during execution. Further, they can find bugs that may not occur in
the common execution paths.
However, most static tools require significant involvement of programmers to build check-
ing models, write specifications, and annotate programs. It is difficult to build good checking
models and specifications since it requires that programmers understand the target system
thoroughly. Further, it is a tedious and time-consuming task for the programmers to write
such specifications and annotations. Therefore, most of the existing bug detection tools are
based on some general checkers that are applicable to any applications. For example, a
program should never dereference a null pointer; a program should release memory that it
no longer needs. Based on such well-known rules, quite a few memory-related bug detection
tools have been proposed, which are quite effective in detecting the well-known bugs such as
null pointer dereference, memory leak, buffer overrun, and so on.
1.2.1 Detecting Semantic Bugs
Unfortunately, the existing detection tools with such checkers can detect only a small fraction
of bugs in modern software. The root causes of most bugs cannot be detected because
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linux-2.6.11/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c:
688 struct scsi_id_instance_data *sbp2_alloc_device
(struct unit_directory *ud)
689 {
           ......
692     struct scsi_id_instance_data *scsi_id = NULL;
           ......
745     scsi_host =  scsi_host_alloc (...);
           ......
753     if (! scsi_add_host (scsi_host, &ud->device)) {
           ......
// scsi_scan_host (scsi_host) is missing!
764 }
Figure 1.1: A semantic bug in Linux 2.6.11
the dominant bugs are application specific. The empirical study of bug characteristics in
Chapter 3 shows that memory related bugs in modern software are not the major ones now,
accounting for only 16.3% in Mozilla and 12.2% in Apache; in contrast, the major root causes
are semantic errors such as missing features, missing cases, wrong control flows, typos, and
some other wrong functionality implementation, which account for 81.1% and 86.7% in total
in Mozilla and Apache, respectively. Most of the semantic bugs violate the rules that should
be obeyed only in a specific application. For example, in Linux, the correct procedure to
probe and initialize a SCSI device includes three steps: first call scsi host alloc to allocate
a data structure for the device driver, then call scsi add host to register the device with the
SCSI stack, and finally scan the host by scsi scan host. Any violation of this procedure
would cause potential errors. Figure 1.1 show the bug missing the last step scsi scan host
in the latest version of Linux. This bug cannot be detected by the existing tools without the
knowledge of SCSI device drivers in Linux.
Therefore, in order to detect semantic bugs, the major ones in modern software, the
checkers should be adaptive to the targeted applications. It indicates that it is necessary to
obtain specifications for different applications instead of using general checkers. However, it
is too tedious and time-consuming for programmers to write such specifications for differ-
ent applications. It would be desirable to automatically generate such application-specific
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checking models and specifications.
Specification Generation A few recent studies have proposed to extract information for
specification generation from source code [ABL02, ECC01, KTB+06a]. The work by Engler,
Chen and Chou [ECC01] has conducted a preliminary investigation in this direction. They
proposed a method to extract programmer MUST and MAY beliefs from source code and
then use them to check for contradictions that indicate potential bugs. MUST beliefs are
always held in programs, which mostly come from the general rules aforementioned in any
applications. On the other hand, MAY beliefs are only observed in source code of a specific
application and they may not be true due to coincidence. Since programmers should follow
them as rules in programming, we call them programming rules in this dissertation. To
extract the programming rules, Engler et at. used some programmer-specified rule templates
such as “function a must be paired with function b”. The two arguments, a and b, will be
fit by passing all plausible pairs that are selected based on statistical analysis and weighted
by naming conventions such as the substrings “lock” and “unlock”. Therefore, the extracted
rules are restricted by the templates and the weights also come from the rules for general
applications, which discriminate the application-specific factors. For example, the program-
ming rule violated by the bug in Linux shown in Figure 1.1 contains three function calls
and one related variable, so it cannot be extracted by the function-pair templates, and the
function calls would get a low weight by naming conventions.
While the work above is inspiring and proposes a promising direction to generate spec-
ifications from source code, it extracts only the programming rules restricted by templates
that depend on some apriori knowledge from programmers. It is not effective enough to
extract information from source code and detect application-specific bugs. Therefore, it is
necessary to propose some general approaches in order to extract the information for spec-
ification generation and bug detection automatically from large software with little human
effort.
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In order to address the issues above, this dissertation project focuses on two challenges:
how to automatically extract application-specific information for bug detection from large
software document and source code, and how to apply such information to bug detection
efficiently.
1.3 Mining Information from Large Software
The huge amount of analysis data in large software such as source code and documents,
however, renders a tedious and difficult task on developers to analyze them. In order to
extract information from such large software and detect bugs, this dissertation proposes to
apply data mining techniques for analysis of source code and documents. This approach is
the first one to apply data mining techniques in bug detection.
Data mining, also known as knowledge discovery in databases (KDD), has been developed
at a rapid pace in recent years due to the wide availability of voluminous data and the
imminent need for extracting useful information and knowledge from them. Traditional
methods of data analysis dependent on human handling cannot scale to huge sizes of data
sets. In contrast, data mining techniques are suitable and efficient to extract information
from large amount of data sets.
1.3.1 Bug Classification
Most previous empirical studies on bug characteristics were based on a small set (usually
with 60–500) of software bugs for the entire software revolution, which may result in a large
experimental error and misleading results. For example, some bugs may not be included
in the sampled set but could account for a significant fraction in the whole bug database
of the evaluated software. Moreover, small size datasets also make it difficult to study the
bug trend with the software evolution because some time intervals under studied may only
contain very few or no bug samples.
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Fortunately, most of the open-source projects maintain bug tracking systems to track
bugs and code changes. Some of them contain hundreds of thousands of bug reports, which
are a valuable asset for us to understand the bug characteristics. However, it is challenging
to obtain useful information from such large datasets written in human natural languages.
For example, Bugzilla database for Mozilla contains more than 300,000 bug reports [moz05].
It is impractical to verify every bug report by manual investigation. Text mining techniques
such as document categorization and information retrieval is a suitable approach to analyze
such large datasets that are written in human natural language. Using text mining, it can
relieve heavy human work to classify and analyze such huge amount of data.
This dissertation proposes using natural language text classification and information re-
trieval techniques to automatically classify a large number of bug reports. Such a large
dataset enables us to provide more accurate results such as trends of bug types with software
evolution and the complexity of bug fixing, which are usually difficult to draw representative
and accurate results from small datasets.
1.3.2 Mining for Programming Rules
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, a large portion of software bugs violate the application-specific
programming rules. To detect such bugs, we need to provide the knowledge about the
specific applications to the checkers, but unfortunately, most of such knowledge is not well
documented.
To address this problem, this dissertation proposes a new approach called PR-Miner that
uses data mining techniques to extract programming rules from large software source code.
The main idea to extract application-specific information from source code is to identify the
frequent programming patterns existing in programs. PR-Miner first converts the source
code into a database, and then apply frequent pattern mining algorithm on it so that we
can find the frequent patterns that can infer programming rules. Due to the scalability of
data mining algorithms, this approach can perform efficiently on large software. The results
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show that PR-Miner can efficiently extract useful information for bug detection, and can also
efficiently detect application-specific bugs that cannot be detected by other existing tools.
1.3.3 Mining for Copy-pasted Code and Related Bugs
Copy-pasted code is very common in large software because programmers prefer reusing
code via copy-paste in order to reduce programming effort. However, copy-pasting is prone
to introducing bugs because errors in code can be propagated by copy-pasting and the
programmer can easily make mistakes in modification after copy-pasting. For example,
some recent work shows that a significant portion of operating system bugs concentrate in
copy-pasted code [CYC+01].
A major reason that copy-paste is error-prone is that programmers may easily incor-
rectly modify or forget to modify identifiers (variables, functions, and types) consistently
throughout the piece of pasted code. Such inconsistent modification also violates the intent
of programmers, and therefore it can be considered as a specific type of violation to the
programming rule that modification within copy-pasted code should be consistent.
Unfortunately, it is challenging to efficiently identify copy-pasted code in large software.
Existing copy-paste detection tools are either not scalable to large software, or cannot handle
small modifications in copy-pasted code. Furthermore, few tools are available to detect copy-
paste related bugs.
To address these problems, this dissertation proposes a novel approach called CP-Miner.
CP-Miner first applies data mining techniques to efficiently identify copy-pasted code in
large software and then compare the copy-pasted code to detect copy-paste related bugs
that contains inconsistent modification.
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1.4 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation proposes using data mining techniques for bug detection to improve soft-
ware reliability. Specifically, this approach uses data mining techniques to extract useful
information from source code and detect bugs, and uses text mining techniques to analyze
bug reports in large software.
1. Empirical Study of Bug Characteristics: To understand the effects of the new
factors on software bugs, we analyze bug characteristics in two large and popular OSS
projects, Mozilla and Apache Web Server, each of which contains up to 4 million
lines of code and about 90 release versions developed over the last 8–10 years. We
first manually examine 362 randomly selected bugs from the bug databases and study
the bug distribution in three dimensions, root causes, impacts and software compo-
nents. Furthermore, this dissertation also studies the statistical correlations among
these dimensions, which has never been systematically studied before (to the best of
our knowledge). In addition, this dissertation also studies 257 security related bugs
and 90 concurrency bugs to understand the characteristics of these emerging types of
bugs.
To validate that the analysis results from the sampled datasets are representative, this
study uses natural language text classification and information retrieval techniques to
automatically classify a large number (around 29,000) of bug reports. Such a
large dataset enables us to provide more accurate results such as trends of bug types
with software evolution and the complexity of bug fixing, which are usually difficult to
draw representative and accurate results from small datasets.
2. PR-Miner: In order to automatically extract implicit programming rules and also
to automatically detect violations, some previous work focuses on simple function-
pair based programming rules and additionally requires programmers to provide rule
templates as we described in Section 1.3.2. PR-Miner uses a data mining technique
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to efficiently extract implicit programming rules from large software code, requiring
little effort from programmers and no prior knowledge of the software. Benefiting from
frequent itemset mining, PR-Miner can extract programming rules in general forms
(without being constrained by any fixed rule templates) that can contain multiple
program elements of various types such as functions, variables and data types. In
addition, this dissertation also proposes an efficient algorithm to automatically detect
violations to the extracted programming rules, which are strong indications of bugs.
This dissertation evaluates PR-Miner with large software, including Linux, PostgreSQL
Server and the Apache Web Server, with 84K–3M LOC each, shows that PR-Miner can
efficiently extract thousands of programming rules and detect violations within a few
minutes. Moreover, PR-Miner has detected hundreds of violations to the extracted
rules. Among the top 60 violations, 16 have been confirmed as bugs in the latest
version of Linux, 6 in PostgreSQL and 1 in Apache. Most of them violate complex
application-specific programming rules and are thereby difficult for previous tools to
detect.
3. CP-Miner: CP-Miner uses data mining techniques to efficiently identify copy-pasted
code in large software including operating system code, and also detects copy-paste
related bugs. It requires no modification or annotation to the source code of software
being analyzed. It takes less than 20 minutes for CP-Miner to identify 190,000 copy-
pasted segments in Linux and 150,000 in FreeBSD. Moreover, CP-Miner has detected
28 copy-paste related bugs in the latest version of Linux and 23 in FreeBSD. In addi-
tion, we analyze some interesting characteristics of copy-paste in Linux and FreeBSD,
including the distribution of copy-pasted code across different length, granularity, mod-
ules, degrees of modification, and various software versions.
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1.5 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the back-
ground of data mining used in our work. Chapter 3 describes the empirical study of bug
characteristics. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on PR-Miner and CP-Miner, respectively.
Chapter 6 discusses the issues in applying data mining to software reliability and the current
limitations with PR-Miner and CP-Miner. Chapter 7 presents related work, and Chapter 8
summarizes this dissertation and discusses the future research direction.
The materials in some chapters have been published as conference papers or journal
articles. The materials in Chapter 5 have been presented in [LLMZ04] and [LLM06], and
the materials in Chapter 4 have been presented in [LZ05].
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Chapter 2
Background of Data Mining
CP-Miner and PR-Miner are based on frequent pattern mining, which is an association
analysis technique to discover frequent patterns in a database [AS94, AS95, GZ03]. Frequent
mining is an active research topic in data mining [YHA03, Zak01]. It has broad applications,
including mining motifs in DNA sequences, analysis of customer shopping behavior, etc. In
our work, we use two types of frequent pattern mining: frequent itemset mining and frequent
sequent mining.
2.1 Frequent Itemset Mining
PR-Miner is based on frequent itemset mining [AS94, GZ03]. The goal of frequent itemset
mining is to efficiently find frequent itemsets in a large database, where an itemset is a set
of items. In a database composed of a large number of itemsets, if a sub-itemset (subset of
an itemset) is contained in more than a specified threshold (called min support) of itemsets,
it is considered frequent. The number of occurrences of a sub-itemset A is denoted as its
support. The itemset that contains A is called its supporting itemset. For example, in an
itemset database D:
D = {{a, b, c, d, e}, {a, b, d, e, f}, {a, b, d, g}, {a, c, h, i}}
The support of sub-itemset {a, b, d} is 3, and its supporting itemsets are {a, b, c, d, e},
{a, b, d, e, f} and {a, b, d, g}, If min support is specified as 3, the frequent sub-itemsets for D
15
are {a}:4, {b}:3, {d}:3, {a, b}:3, {a, d}:3, {b, d}:3 and {a, b, d}:3, where the numbers are the
supports of the corresponding sub-itemsets.
Frequent itemset mining can be classified into two categories: the Apriori-like approach [AS94]
and FP-tree-based (Frequent Pattern tree based) approach [HPY00]. Compared with the
Apriori-like approach that needs multiple database scans, the FP-tree-based approach only
needs two database scans, and thereby is more efficient.
To solve the frequent itemset mining problem, quite a few algorithms have been proposed.
PR-Miner uses a FP-tree-based mining algorithm called FPclose [GZ03], which is one of the
most efficient frequent itemset mining algorithms. Instead of generating the complete set of
frequent sub-itemsets, FPclose mines only the closed sub-itemsets. A closed sub-itemset is
the sub-itemset whose support is different from that of its super-itemsets. In the example
above, the frequent sub-itemsets {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, d} and {b, d} are not closed since their
supports are the same as their super-itemset {a, b, d}. FPclose only generates the closed
sub-itemsets {a}:4 and {a, b, d}:3 as result. This can significantly improve time and space
performance since it can avoid generating exponential number of frequent sub-itemsets.
After all closed frequent sub-itemsets are mined from an itemset database, association
rules can be generated. An association rule can be denoted as X ⇒ Y with confidence c
and support s, where X and Y are itemsets. The meaning of the rule is that if an itemset
contains X, it also contains Y with probability of c [AS94, HGN00]. Association rules allow
violation detection. If the confidence is very high, say 99%, the itemset that contains only
X but not Y violates the rule, indicating a potential outlier. Due to space limitation, we do
not describe the details of the FPclose algorithm since they can be found in [GZ03].
2.2 Frequent Sequence Mining
Other than frequent itemset mining, frequent sequence mining is also an important topic
in frequent pattern mining. The major difference is that the items have order and can
16
be duplicated in a transaction in the database for frequent sequence mining [AS95]. For
example, the sequential pattern xy is different from yx. Accordingly, there are also closed
frequent sequence mining algorithms such as CloSpan [YHA03].
Similarly, a subsequence is considered frequent when it occurs in at least min support
in the sequence database. A subsequence is not necessarily contiguous in an original se-
quence. A sequence that contains a given subsequence is called a supporting sequence of this
subsequence.
For example, a sequence database D has five sequences:
D = {abced, abecf, agbch, abijc, aklc}
The number of occurrences of subsequence abc is 4, and sequence agbch is one of abc’s
supporting sequences. If min support is specified as 4, the frequent subsequences are
{a : 5, b : 4, c : 5, ab : 4, ac : 5, bc : 4, abc : 4}, where the numbers are the supports of the subse-
quences.
CP-Miner uses a recently proposed frequent subsequence mining algorithm called CloSpan
(Closed Sequential Pattern M ining)[YHA03], which outperforms most previous algorithms.
CloSpan mainly consists of two stages: (1) using a depth-first search procedure to generate
a candidate set of frequent subsequences that includes all the closed frequent subsequences;
and (2) pruning the non-closed subsequences from the candidate set. The computational
complexity of CloSpan is O(n2) if the maximum length of frequent sequences is constrained
by a constant.
There are two main ideas in CloSpan to improve the mining efficiency. The first idea is
based on an obvious observation that if a sequence is frequent, then all of its subsequences are
frequent. For example, if a sequence abc is frequent, all of its subsequences {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}
are frequent. CloSpan recursively produces a longer frequent subsequence by concatenating
every frequent item to a shorter frequent subsequence that has already been obtained in the
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previous iterations.
To better explain this idea, let us consider an example. Let Ln denote the set of frequent
subsequences with length n. In order to get Ln, we can join the sets Ln−1 and L1. For
example, suppose we have already computed L1 and L2 as shown below. In order to compute
L3, we can first compute L
′
3 by concatenating a subsequence from L2 and an item from L1:
L1 = {a, b, c};
L2 = {ab, ac, bc};
L′3 = L2 × L1 = {abc, abb, abc, aca, acb, acc, bca, bcb, bcc}
For greater efficiency, CloSpan does not join the sequences in set L2 with all the items
in L1. Instead, each sequence in L2 is concatenated with only the frequent items in its
suffix database. In our example, for the frequent sequence ab in L2, its suffix database is
Dab = {ced, cef, ch, ijc}, and only c is the frequent item, so ab is only concatenated with c
and then we get a longer sequence abc that belongs to L′3.
The second idea is used for efficiently evaluating whether a concatenated subsequence
is frequent or not. It tries to avoid searching through the whole database. Instead, it only
checks with certain suffixes. In the above example, for each sequence s in L′3, CloSpan
checks whether it is frequent or not by searching the suffix database Ds. If the number of
its occurrences is greater than min sup, s is added into L3, which is the set of frequent
subsequences of length 3. CloSpan continues computing L4 from L3, L5 from L4, and so on
until no more subsequences can be added into the set of frequent subsequences.
Recently we have used CloSpan to detect block correlations in storage systems [LCSZ04],




Empirical Study of Bug
Characteristics
Software failures greatly reduce system reliability. As software becomes more and more
complex, there is an urgent need to explore more effective software testing and debugging
tools and software engineering methods to minimize the number of bugs that escape into
production runs. According to a report from NIST [NIS02], improvements in software testing
could eliminate about $22.2 billions of business loss in US caused by software errors annually.
Since some bugs still slip through even the strictest testing, system designers also need to
provide fault tolerant mechanisms to recover from these inevitable software failures.
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Bug Sources
To discover what has changed now, we study bugs from two large widely-used new OSS
projects, Mozilla and Apache HTTP Server. We choose these two projects mainly for the
following reasons:
(1) They are new in two aspects. They are developed by the new open-source development
paradigm and are newly developed over the recent 8 to 10 years, which is after many empirical
studies were conducted. Yet, they are stable and mature, and have evolved long enough to
allow for the study of bug characteristics through the software lifetime. In particular, they
have been developed around 8 years after the release of many bug detection tools (around
1997) to allow us to study the impact of bug detection tools on memory bugs.
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(2) They are two of the most successful OSS projects. Mozilla was rated as the best of
2003 by PCWorld [bes]. Apache is the most widely-used web server, used by 71.0% of near
53 million sites polled in a survey [net05].
(3) They are large modern software applications. The Mozilla suite contains 4 million
LOC and there are about 90 releases developed over the last 8 years, while Apache HTTP
Server contains 310 thousand LOC and around 90 releases developed over 10 years.
(4) They have large well-maintained Bugzilla databases [apa05, moz05], which contain
hundreds of thousands of well-structured bug reports reported by many users as well as
developers.
Randomly Collecting Bugs In our study, we focus on the characteristics of software er-
rors that manifest at run time, that is, excluding new feature requests, compile-time errors,
configuration errors, environmental errors, and software maintenance. To ensure correct
classification, we only study fixed runtime bugs whose root causes can be identified from
reports because unfixed bugs may be invalid and root causes described in the reports can
be wrong. In this way, we randomly select 548 fixed bug reports from the Mozilla Bugzilla
database [moz05]. As not every report describes a runtime bug, we manually investigate
them and narrow down to 264 runtime bugs, and then classify them manually. We study
bug characteristics based on these manual labeled data, and further use them to train and
evaluate automatic classifiers for the whole bug database as described in Section 3.2.2. Sim-
ilarly, we randomly select 209 fixed bug reports from the Apache Bugzilla database [apa05],
and then manually classify 98 runtime bugs. All bugs collected are reported since 1998 for
Mozilla and since 2002 for Apache, when Bugzilla was adopted by these two applications.
In the rest of this chapter, we use the general name “bugs” to refer to fixed runtime bugs.
Collecting Security Bugs We collect all of the 193 security vulnerabilities in Mozilla and
all of the 64 in Apache Web Server kept in National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [NVD05b].
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3.2 Bug Classification and Analysis
In this section, we first describe the categories of bug types. We then describe how to
automatically classify bugs into these categories, how we study the trend and the correlation
of different categories.
3.2.1 Bug Categories
We classify bugs in three dimensions, Root Cause, Impact and Software component.
According to root causes, bugs can be classified into three disjoint categories, Memory,
Concurrency, and Semantic, whose definition as well as the definition of impact categories, is
shown in Table 3.1. Memory bug and semantic bugs are further classified into sub-categories
as shown in table 3.2.
This classification allows for the study of distribution of some important types of bugs,
e.g. memory, concurrency, and semantic. In addition, by comparing with the distribution of
similar types of bugs in previous work [CC00, CKC91, End75, SC91, SC92], we study the
change of bug characteristics in modern OSS. Combining classification with other techniques,
such as, trend study, and measuring the correlation, we can answer interesting questions,
such as (1) whether the number of concurrency bugs decreases and (2) what root causes lead
to more crashes now. To estimate the statistical errors caused by sampling, we compute the
confidence intervals with 95% confidence level for distribution of each category.
Classifying Security Vulnerabilities Security vulnerabilities are manually classified in
three dimensions. The root cause dimension is the same as that of general bugs. Based
on impact, vulnerabilities are classified into four categories, confidentiality (unauthorized
disclosure of information), integrity (unauthorized modification), availability (disruption of
service), and access (unauthorized access). The third dimension is the NVD severity, which
contains three levels, High, Medium, and Low, as defined in [nvd05a].
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Dimension Category Description Abbr.
Memory Bugs caused by improper handling of memory
objects.
Mem
Root Concurrency Bugs that happen only in multi-threading (or
multi-processes) environment, including data
race, deadlock, and synchronization.
Con
Cause Semantic Inconsistent with the original design require-
ments or the programmers’ intention. We
consider all bugs as Semantic bugs unless they
are already classified as Memory bugs or Con-
currency bugs.
Sem
Hang Program keeps running but does not respond. Hang
Crash Program halts abnormally. Crash
Impact Data Corruption Mistakenly change user data. Corrupt
Performance
Degradation
Functions correctly but runs/responds slowly. Perf
Incorrect Func-
tionality
Not behave as expected. Func
Core Bugs related to core functionality implemen-
tations.
Core
Software GUI Bugs related to graphical user interfaces. GUI
Component Network Bugs related to network environment and net-
work communication.
Network
I/O Bugs related to I/O handling. I/O
Table 3.1: Categories of three dimensions
Some categories and definitions are borrowed from BugBench [LLQ+05].
3.2.2 Automatic Classification
The whole bug databases contain hundreds of thousands of bug reports, so it may result in
large statistical variances in distribution analysis by sampling only hundreds of bugs.
To verify the analysis results from the sampled datasets, we propose a novel method
to automatically classify a large number of bugs, and then study bug characteristics based
on such a large dataset. Specifically, we apply text classification and information retrieval
techniques on the bug reports to automatically classify 29,000 bugs. Such a large dataset
also enables us to perform study on trend and complexity of fixing. Our method consists of
the following steps:
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Category Sub-category Description Abbr.
Memory Leak Failures to release unused memory. MLK
Uninitialized
Memory Read
Read memory data before it is initialized. UMR
Memory Dangling Pointer Pointers still keep freed memory addresses. Dangling
Bug NULL Pointer
Dereference
Dereference of a null pointer. NULL
Overflow Illegal access beyond the buffer boundary. Overflow
Double Free One memory location is freed twice. 2Free
Missing Features A feature is supposed to be but is not imple-
mented.
MissF
Missing Cases A case in a functionality is not implemented. MissC





The control flow is incorrectly implemented. CtrlFlow
Bug Exception Han-
dling
Do not have proper exception handling. Except
Processing Processing such as evaluation of expressions
and equations is incorrect.
Process




Any other semantic bug that does not meet
the design requirement.
FuncImpl
Table 3.2: Subcategories of memory and semantic bugs
Some definitions are borrowed from BugBench [LLQ+05] and a book [Bei90].
• Preprocessing In Bugzilla databases, each bug report may contain the following in-
formation: bug ID, summary, time, status, reporter, assignee, severity, bug description,
discussion comments, test cases, attachments, etc. We include most of the information
except time and attachments because time is irrelevant for our classification, and the
major contents in attachments are source code that is hard for current classifiers to
use. We represent bug documents in word level, called bag-of-words approach. Each
word in bug documents is parsed into an index. Each bug document is represented by
a vector.
• Training We use the manually-labeled bugs as a training set to produce classification
models for different categories of bugs. We use several different classifier learning
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methods, including support vector machine(SVM) [Vap95], Winnow, Perceptron, and
Naive Bayes [RZ98]. We choose the best one based on their accuracy.
We randomly divide the whole sampling dataset into two halves: training set for
learning and tuning, and test set for accuracy evaluation. Applying the classification
methods on the training set, we can get several models for different categories. Since
each method has some parameters, we explore the entire parameter space and use n-fold
(n = 5) cross validation [Joa02] to find out the best method with the best parameter
setting based on the accuracy metrics described in Section 3.2.2. Additionally, to avoid
the errors of accuracy evaluation caused by tuning, we use only the training set for
tuning and use the test set for accuracy evaluation. Therefore, the test set does not
affect parameter tuning, and so accuracy evaluation based on the test set could be
representative for the whole dataset.
• Evaluating Accuracy To evaluate how good the classification models are, we can
measure the prediction accuracy. Four different types of prediction results are possible
from a binary classifier:
Predicted Class
Yes No
Actual Yes True Positive (T+) False Negative (F−)
Class No False Positive (F+) True Negative (T−)





), and F1, which is an even combination of precision and recall (F1 = 2PR
P+R
).
When precision and recall are equally important, F1 can be used. For bug classification,
the accuracy goal is both of high precision and recall, so we use F1 as the accuracy
metric in learning parameter tuning.
• Applying Classification Model After we obtain classification models for each cate-
gory, we apply them on the whole database to predict which categories a bug probably
belongs to. Specifically, we use the 548 sampled fixed bug reports as training and test
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data to learn a model, and apply it on the whole database to identify runtime bugs.
Among all 75,519 fixed bugs in the whole database for Mozilla, 28,928 bugs are iden-
tified as runtime bugs with precision of 89.6% in the test set. Then the classification
model for each bug category is applied on the 28,928 runtime bugs.
Some bug categories such as concurrency bugs only constitute a very small percentage
of all reported bugs. Therefore, random sampling cannot provide enough data for classifier
training. To solve this problem, we apply information retrieval techniques [JWR00] on the
bug database to retrieve the specific category of bugs.
3.2.3 Studying the Trend
To study the trend of different categories of bugs, including memory, concurrency, semantic,
and security bugs, we calculate the number and relative percentage of bugs in each category
reported in each year. Some previous work investigates the trend of bug density over re-
leases [OW02], but it does not study the trend of different categories of bugs. Our analysis
method on a large dataset enables us to study the change of different categories over time.
3.2.4 Studying the Complexity of Fixing
It is interesting to look at how long it takes to respond to a bug report and to fix it for
different categories. Toward this end, we examine both response time and resolution time.
The response time of a bug is the time between a bug is reported and a bug is taken care of.
We approximate this time by the difference between the report time and the time a report is
replied by others. The resolution time is the time between a bug is reported and it is marked
as fixed when the fix is checked in to code base. A bug report’s resolution time encompasses
its response time.
In addition, we also study size-related complexity of fixing, which is the number of dif-
ferent lines of code (changed, added, and deleted) to fix different types of bugs.
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In order to help above study of bug fixing, we also collect the bug “priority” information
from Bugzilla. The priority is a level number: 1 as the most and 5 as the least prioritized.
They are assigned by developers before and during fixing based on urgency and difficulty.
3.2.5 Measuring the Correlation
To study the correlation between two categories in different dimensions, we use a statistical
metric called lift. The lift of category Ai in dimension A and category Bj in dimension B,
lift(Ai, Bj), is calculated as
P (AiBj)
P (Ai)∗P (Bj)
, where P (AiBj) is the probability that a bug belongs
to both category Ai and Bj. If lift(Ai, Bj) is equal to 1, it means P (AiBj) = P (Ai)P (Bj),
which indicates that category Ai and Bj are not correlated. If it is greater than 1, category
Ai and Bj are positively correlated, which means that if a bug belongs to Ai, it is more likely
to also belongs to Bj.
3.3 Root Cause Analysis
We first present the analysis results based on sampled datasets in Section 3.3 and 3.4, and
then present the results based on automatic classification in Section 3.6 to confirm that the
results from sampled datasets are representative.
In this section, we analyze the root causes of bugs in modern software and compare our
results with those in the previous studies [SC91, SC92], so that we can understand some
important bug characteristic changes.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the distribution of bugs with different root causes and their cor-
responding impacts. From these figures, we can observe the following:
Memory Bugs Have Decreased. Figure 3.1(a) shows that memory bugs account for a
relatively small fraction of all bugs, 16.3% in Mozilla and 12.2% in Apache. These percentages
are much lower than the 28–38% reported in previous work [SC91, SC92]. Since debugging
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of root causes with impacts
(The numbers show 95% confidence intervals.)
using these tools in recent years.
Figure 3.1(b) shows that among memory bugs, NULL pointer dereference is a major
cause, accounting for 37.2–41.7% in the memory categories, and most of them resulting in
a system crash. Memory leak is another major cause, accounting for 16.7–30.2% of memory
bugs, which is much more than the 8% reported previously [SC92]. This may be because
memory leaks are relatively more difficult to detect without tools since their impacts may
be “silent” within some time. Since most memory bugs can be detected by the existing tools
such as Purify, Valgrind and Coverity [cov05], our results indicate that these debugging tools
have not been used in development with their full capacity yet.
Semantic Bugs Are Dominant Root Causes. Figure 3.1(a) shows that the dominant
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root causes are semantic errors in both applications, accounting for 81.1% in Mozilla and
86.7% in Apache. These results are much more than the 57–62% reported in a previous
study [SC92] (bugs excluding memory bugs and concurrency bugs). Therefore, semantic
bugs not only remain to be the dominant root causes, but also seem to have become more
dominant.
One possible reason may be that most semantic bugs are application specific and are
different from memory bugs which are general for any applications. Thus a programmer can
easily introduce semantic bugs due to a lack of thorough understanding of the system, its
requirements or its specifications. Additionally, it is harder to automatically detect semantic
bugs because they are more application specific. The percentage increase of semantic bugs
may be attributed to the decrease of memory bugs. Further, the previous work [SC92] is
based on commercial software, while our study is based on OSS whose specifications are not
well defined as commercial software, and hence resulting in more semantic bugs in OSS.
In order to further understand what are the major causes among semantic bugs, in Fig-
ure 3.1(c), we show the breakdown of semantic bugs into subcategories. We see that most
semantic bugs are caused by wrong functionality implementation that does not meet the
design requirements. In addition, missing features and missing cases also account for a large
portion of semantic bugs, which is consistent with the previous study [CKC91]. Since knowl-
edge about the target system is critical for avoiding and detecting such semantic bugs, these
results suggest that it would be beneficial to develop techniques to automatically extract
specifications from programs, similar to Daikon [ECGN01] and our previous work [LZ05].
Interestingly, there are quite a few simple semantic bugs. For example, typo errors
account for 9.4–9.8% of the semantic bugs. It indicates that careless programming is still
causing many bugs, suggesting that the development environment should provide some tools
for programmers to check for simple errors such as typos and copy-and-paste related bugs
(as our previous work [LLMZ04] does).
In order to further understand concurrency bugs, instead of randomly sampling, we use
28
information retrieval technique to obtain possible concurrency bugs; the results are presented
in Section 3.9.
3.4 Impact Analysis
In this section, we study the distribution of impacts and the correlation between impacts
and root causes.
Dominant Impacts Figure 3.2 summarizes the distribution of different impacts with the
corresponding root causes. It shows that incorrect functionality is the dominant impact;
indeed, the percentage of incorrect functionality is 64.3–69.4%, much larger than the 35%
reported in the previous work [SC91]. This is because the percentage of semantic bugs has
significantly increased in modern software and most of them cause incorrect functionality as











































































































































Figure 3.2: Distribution of impacts
In contrast, because memory bugs have decreased substantially, the severe impacts on
availability, including crashes and hangs, have also been reduced to 18.4–22.0%. However,
although the percentage of these impacts is reduced, they still account for a considerable
portion and can significantly compromise availability. Thus, recovery techniques are still
needed to provide highly available services.
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Correlations Between Causes and Impacts Figure 3.2 also shows that the major
cause of crashes is memory bugs, accounting for 53.8–57.1%, which is similar to what has
been found in the previous work [SC91]. Semantic bugs are clearly more likely to cause
incorrect functionality, accounting for 96.6–98.5%, which is also consistent with the previous
studies. However, among the crashes, 42.9–44.2% are contributed from semantic bugs, which
is higher than that reported in the previous work [SC91]. It indicates that although most
semantic bugs result in incorrect functionality, they are also one of the important factors of
unavailability.
In order to further understand the correlation between causes and impacts, we show
the correlation metric lift in Table 3.3. Not surprisingly, here we see that hanging has an
extremely strong correlation with concurrency bugs, while crashing has a strong correlation
with memory bugs. The (incorrect) functionality impact has a relatively strong correlation
with semantic bugs, though no specific subcategory of semantic bug has an exceptionally
high correlation. Interestingly, although semantic bugs are overall negatively correlated with
crashing and hanging, some specific semantic bugs are positively correlated with them.
Impact Memory Concurrency Semantic
Hang 0.77 9.43 0.77
Crash 3.31 0.73 0.55
Func. 0.11 0.65 1.19
Impact Memory Subcategories
MLK UMR NULL
Hang 0.00 0.00 2.06
Crash 0.78 3.05 5.08
Func. 0.23 0.30 0.00
Impact Semantic Subcategories
MissF MissC CornerC CtrlFlow Except Process Typo FuncImpl
Hang 0.00 2.20 0.00 2.36 5.08 0.00 0.00 0.35
Crash 0.22 0.68 1.13 0.73 1.95 0.00 0.73 0.38
Func. 1.31 1.31 1.01 1.08 0.70 1.21 0.86 1.33
Table 3.3: Correlation between root causes and impacts in Mozilla
Categories with too few examples are not shown due to statistical insignificance.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of bugs in software components
Component Memory Concurrency Semantic
Core 1.84 1.06 0.83
GUI 0.31 1.09 1.14
Component Memory Subcategories
MLK UMR NULL
Core 1.71 1.97 1.85
GUI 0.29 0.38 0.36
Component Semantic Subcategories
MissF MissC CornerC CtrlFlow Except Process Typo FuncImpl
Core 0.75 0.99 0.82 1.06 1.14 0.99 0.35 0.81
GUI 1.32 1.01 1.06 0.81 0.73 1.14 1.45 1.15
Table 3.4: Correlation between root causes and software components in Mozilla
In this section, we study where the dominant bugs are located in software components,
including core, GUI, network, I/O, and others. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no previous work on studying bug characteristics from this perspective. Since the modern
software tends to emphasize friendly user interfaces, we are particularly interested in studying
characteristics of GUI bugs. Due to the lags of GUI testing techniques, we believe that
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characterization of GUI bugs is very important.
Bug distribution in software components Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of bugs
within different components and their impacts. As we can see, GUI modules are critical for
software reliability in modern graphical interface software, such as Mozilla. GUI modules
account for more than half of bugs in Mozilla and also cause around 30% of Mozilla crashes.
Unfortunately, GUI testing techniques still lag far behind now. Future research should pay
more attention to GUI related testing and debugging.
Root causes of GUI bugs The correlations between software components and root causes
for Mozilla are shown in Table 3.4. Interestingly, the results indicate that bugs within GUI
and core modules have quite different root causes. The major root cause of bugs in core
modules is memory related, while that of GUI bugs is semantic and concurrency bugs.
Such difference is likely because the GUI modules and their development process are quite
different from other modules. Further, GUI bugs are correlated to the sub-categories of
missing features and other wrong functionality implementation that are application specific.
The results indicate that the existing debugging tools aiming at memory bugs are unsuitable
for GUI bugs, while study on application-specific semantic bugs can be helpful.
3.6 Automatic Classification
This section presents our results with automatic classification so that we can confirm that
the results of distribution based on the sampled bugs in previous sections are representative.
Some further improvement on the classification accuracy could be done such as exploiting
higher level information to represent documents and optimizing the queries in information
retrieval for small categories as described in Section 3.2.2.
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Distribution of Root Causes Table 3.5 shows the distribution of bugs with different
root causes. Compared with the results using sampled bugs in Section 3.3, the percentage of
memory and semantic bugs are similar, which indicates that the distribution results based
on sampled bugs and a large dataset are consistent.
Cause Percentage Classification Accuracy
Precision Recall F1
Memory 13.2% 0.736 0.929 0.821
Semantic 78.0% 0.874 0.954 0.912
Table 3.5: Distribution of root causes based on automatic classification
Precision, recall, and F1 are defined in Section 3.2.2.
Trend of Root Causes In order to understand the trend of bug distribution along soft-
ware evolution, we plot the relative percentages of memory and semantic bugs in Figure 3.4.
Although software becomes mature and stable, semantic bugs that are specific to applica-
tions still remain dominant. Semantic bugs increase gradually with the maturity of software,
while memory bugs decrease gradually. However, both types have not changed too much,
compared with concurrency bugs that are decreasing significantly (Section 3.9). Bug detec-
tion tools such as Purify only affect the relative percentage of memory bugs a little during
this period, because they had become available before 1999 and are used during these years.
Distribution of Impacts Table 3.6 shows the distribution of bugs with different impacts.
Compared with the results using sampled bugs in Section 3.3, the distribution is similar.
Impact Percentage Classification Accuracy
Precision Recall F1
Hang 2.5% 0.714 0.833 0.769
Crash 13.0% 0.852 0.852 0.852
Data corruption 1.8% 0.400 1.00 0.571
Performance degradation 2.2% 0.500 0.500 0.500
Incorrect Functionality 75.2% 0.860 0.909 0.884

















Figure 3.4: Trend of bugs with different root causes
3.7 Difficulty of Bug Fixing
In this section, we study the difficulty in fixing different bugs. Mockus and Herbsleb [MFH02]
studied the resolution time in OSS, but they only analyzed the relation between resolution
time and fixing priority and verified the intuition that the bugs with higher priority are
fixed more quickly. Differently, we analyze how difficult it is to fix bugs of different causes,
especially in the context of with or without debugging tools. In order to understand other
factors besides resolution time, we also analyze the size of patches that can indicate how
complex to fix the bugs, which has never been studied before as far as we know. Our
analysis is based on the automatic classification data so that the statistical results can be
more representative with less variance.
Patch Size Figure 3.5(a) shows that it needs 106 LOC to fix a bug on average. Considering
different root causes, it is relatively simple to fix memory bugs. The patch for a memory bug
is around 71 LOC, while each semantic bug needs 111 LOC. The reason is that memory bugs
are usually caused by careless programming and it is usually unnecessary to re-implement
the functionality. Interestingly, considering different impacts, performance bugs are more



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Response and resolution time
Figure 3.5: Patch size, response time and resolution time in Mozilla
Each bar shows the average number with 95% confidence intervals.
Response Time and Resolution Time Figure 3.5(b) shows that the average response
time and resolution time are 16 days and 110 days in Mozilla, respectively. Considering the
bugs with different root causes, it takes the shortest time, 62 days only, to fix memory bugs.
One reason is that nowadays memory bugs are relatively easy to fix because quite a few
debugging tools are effective for identifying the root causes of memory bugs. In contrast,
semantic bugs generally take a much longer time (117 days) to fix, because there are relatively
fewer tools to help detect semantic bugs automatically. For some semantic bugs, the long
resolution time may be also caused by their low fixing priority.
Debugging Tools and Resolution time Most of the available debugging tools used by
developers aim at memory bugs. Section 3.3 showed that memory bugs are decreasing likely
because of using bug detection tools. Among the 43 memory bugs we manually verified in
Mozilla, the programmers explicitly indicated that they used Purify for debugging in six
reports. The average resolution time of these six bugs is 14 days, much shorter than the
overall memory bugs, 62 days, which indicates that bug detection tools can significantly
facilitate diagnosing root causes, thus speed up bug fixing.
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3.8 Security Related Bugs
Security is becoming increasingly important recently. However, previous work has not ad-
dressed how software errors affect security. To study the security related bugs, we collect 193
security vulnerabilities in Mozilla and 64 in Apache HTTP Server from NVD [NVD05b]. In
this section we would like to understand (1) whether security bugs are increasing, (2) what
types of bugs cause vulnerability, and (3) whether security related bugs are fixed faster than
other bugs.
Are Security Related Bugs Increasing? Figure 3.6(a) shows the numbers of vulnera-
bilities along time. We also normalize the numbers to relative percentage by comparing with
the total fixed bugs reported in Bugzilla during the corresponding year. The trend shows
that the numbers of vulnerabilities are increasing for both Mozilla and Apache. Although
there are some exceptional points in some years, such as Mozilla in 2003 1, the normalized
percentages are increasing significantly over the recent years. It demonstrates that security
issue is becoming increasingly important for both client and server software.
What Types of Bugs Lead to Vulnerabilities? Figure 3.6(b) shows the distribution of
root causes and severity for security bugs. Surprisingly, memory bugs account for only 8.8–
17.2%, while semantic bugs cause 71.9–83.9% of vulnerabilities. This finding is against the
belief that buffer overflows are the most common form of security vulnerability [CWP+00].
The reason may be that most buffer overflows have been detected and fixed before release
due to the available debugging tools recently.
The different distribution of impacts for Mozilla and Apache shown in Figure 3.6(c)
indicates that vulnerabilities have different impacts on client and server systems. For client
systems, most security bugs result in unauthorized accesses, while for Apache Web Server,
both availability and unauthorized accesses are the major vulnerabilities.
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(d) Response and resolution time for Mozilla
Figure 3.6: Security related bugs collected from NVD
The correlation metric lift shown in Table 3.7 indicates that memory bugs are more severe
than the other types of bugs, and they are likely to cause unavailability and unauthorized
accesses because systems can be intruded by exploiting buffer overflows [Ano]. Thus besides
reducing the number of buffer overflows in source code using bug detection tools, it is also
important to prevent attackers from exploiting them. StackGuard [CPM+98] is such a tool
that can protect against stack smash attacks. In addition, semantic bugs are less severe than
memory bugs, and are likely to cause confidentiality and integrity problems.
Are Security Bugs Fixed Faster? Figure 3.6(d) shows the average response and resolu-
tion time for security bugs compared with all the 264 sampled bugs in Mozilla. Surprisingly,
the response time for the security related bugs is longer than the overall bugs; especially, the
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Cause Severity Impact
High Medium Low Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access
Mem 1.80/1.62 0.55/2.91 0.00/0.31 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.65 3.01/1.29 1.31/2.22
Con 0.00/0.00 1.65/8.00 2.51/0.00 6.40/4.92 0.00/7.11 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
Sem 0.87/0.85 1.09/0.52 1.14/1.17 1.11/1.18 1.19/1.08 0.85/0.93 0.92/0.73
Others 0.58/1.19 1.27/0.00 1.94/1.12 1.65/0.82 1.82/0.00 0.00/1.19 0.59/0.00
Table 3.7: Correlation between root causes and severity/impacts for security related bugs
The first number is for Mozilla, and the second one is for Apache Web Server.
response time for the security bugs with high severity is much longer than the other bugs,
so is their resolution time. The response time is longer could be because the communica-
tion between developers is hidden from the publicly accessible forum in Bugzilla for security
concerns.
Since the deviation for high-severity bugs is much larger than others, we doubted that
there are some cases with long resolution time. We found that four security bugs with high
severity took more than one year to fix. These bugs are extremely difficult to fix, which
makes the average resolution time longer than the others. We should also note that these
long response and resolution time do not imply less attention from developers. Actually, the
average priority level of security bugs is 1.52 (the smaller level, the higher priority), the most
prioritized among all bug categories we have studied. It is possible that, since very critical,
these security bugs’ fixing and patch validation are done in a very careful way, which extend
the diagnosis and fixing period. The response and resolution time for the security bugs with
medium and low severity are shorter than other bugs, which means that they are fixed faster.
Our results indicate that although security bugs are important, some of them need to take a
long time to fix, which can lead to a long vulnerability window. Therefore, before the patch
is available, we should use some techniques to detect attacks and to prevent attacks from
exploiting the vulnerability. For example, recently Joshi et al. [JKDC05] proposed using
vulnerability-specific predicates to detect when vulnerabilities are triggered.
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3.9 Concurrency Bugs
Because concurrency bugs account for only a small portion in bug report databases, it
is difficult to study their characteristics by randomly sampling hundreds of bug reports.
Therefore, we use information retrieval techniques to obtain potential concurrency bugs,
and then manually verify these potential concurrency bugs. In this way, we have collected
90 concurrency bugs from the top of retrieval results for Mozilla. The larger available dataset
allows us to study the characteristics of concurrency bugs, which has never been done before.
Are Concurrency Bugs Increasing? Figure 3.7(a) shows the changes of concurrency
bugs over time in Mozilla. Unexpectedly, the number of concurrency bugs increased only in
the first two years (1999–2000) but sharply decreased later. To show the relative percentage,
we normalize the number by all fixed bugs in the corresponding year (which is not absolute
percentage because we only collect part of concurrency bugs). The relative percentage has
the same trend except in 2005. Considering the evolution of Mozilla, the number and relative
percentage of concurrency bugs increased, and then decreased as the software became stable,























































































(b) Impacts and components
Figure 3.7: Concurrency bugs in Mozilla
However, the previous studies [CC00, Gra86] indicated the perception that the relative
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percentage of Heisenbugs (transient bugs) should increase when the software becomes stable
because the other non-transient bugs are fixed but the transient bugs are still remaining in the
software. Our finding about the trend of concurrency bugs does not follow this perception.
A possible explanation is that the hard-to-reproduce concurrency bugs are underreported.
Before the software became stable (the first two years), most of the concurrency bugs that
could be easily reproduced were reported and fixed, and the other concurrency bugs that
were difficult to reproduce were not reported and remained in software. When we verified
the concurrency bugs, we found that most of them could not be reproduced by developers with
an acceptable probability, say more than once out of ten times. Therefore, when the software
became stable, even though the software still contained many concurrency bugs, the failures
caused by them were unlikely to be reported by users or to be fixed by developers because
they were difficult to reproduce.
What Are the Impacts from Concurrency Bugs? Figure 3.7(b) shows the distri-
bution of impacts from concurrency bugs. Compared with all bugs shown in Figure 3.2,
concurrency bugs can cause much more severe impacts on systems, which is consistent with
previous work [SC92]. Specifically, 42.2% of concurrency bugs can cause hanging due to
synchronization errors and deadlocks, 10 times higher than all bugs. Further, 55.5% of
concurrency bugs lead to fail-stop failures (crashes and hangs), which can be detected and
recovered by generic recovery techniques.
3.10 Summary
This empirical study investigates the impacts of new factors on software errors and studies
the bug characteristics in two large modern OSS projects. It uses text classification and
information retrieval techniques to automatically classify tens of thousands of bugs and
classifies bugs from different dimensions and investigates the correlation between categories
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in different dimensions.
This empirical study has discovered several interesting findings:
• Memory bugs only account for 12.2–16.3%, much less than the 28–38% reported in
previous studies [SC91, SC92], indicating memory bugs are becoming less pervasive
due to the available techniques to automatically detect them. Our results also show
bug detection tools can effectively reduce the diagnosis and resolution time of memory
bugs. However, we also found that there still exist many simple memory bugs such as
memory leaks and NULL pointer dereferences, indicating memory bug detection tools
have not been used at their full capacity.
• Semantic bugs are the major root causes, accounting for 81.1–86.7%, and their per-
centages increases with the maturity of software. Moreover, they also have severe
impacts on system availability, contributing to 42.9–44.2% of crashes. Additionally, it
takes a longer time to diagnose and fix semantic bugs, almost twice as memory bugs.
Our results suggest that more effort should be put into automatically detecting and
diagnosing semantic bugs.
• Careless programming causes many bugs. For example, some simple bugs such as typos
account for 9.4–9.8% of semantic bugs. Although their fixes are usually simple, it takes
a longer time to diagnose them than to diagnose memory bugs, which suggests that
software development environments such as Microsoft Visual Studio and Eclipse should
provide more support to avoid them in the early stages of software development.
• Most bugs result in incorrect functionality due to the dominance of semantic bugs. In
contrast, only 14.3–19.1% bugs, mostly memory bugs, results in crashes. In addition
to memory bugs, semantic bugs related to corner cases and exception handling are also
highly likely to cause crashes.
• Our results show that security bugs are increasing significantly over time in terms of
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number and relative percentage. Among different root causes of security vulnerabili-
ties, memory related bugs contribute for only 8.8–17.2% but are usually severe, while
semantic bugs are the dominant cause, accounting for 71.9–83.9%. Surprisingly, we
found that some security bugs with high severe impacts took more than one year to
fix after being reported, which means that system security can be easily compromised
during such a long vulnerability window.
• GUI bugs have become the major ones in graphical interface software, accounting for
52.7% of bugs in Mozilla, and resulting in 28.8% of all crashes. Furthermore, most
GUI bugs are caused by semantic errors, which indicates that designing good GUI test
cases with good coverages is probably the only way to significantly reduce the number
of GUI bugs.
• Concurrency bugs account for a small portion of bug reports, probably because they
are underreported. We found that 55.5% of them cause hangs or crashes, which means
that most of them are benign faults (fail stop) so that most failures caused by them
should be able to recover using simple generic techniques such as restart or rollback
and reexecute.
Overall, these results not only provide software development with a good understanding







Programs usually follow many implicit programming rules. A simple example of a program-
ming rule is the function call pair of lock and unlock: a call to lock should be followed
by a call to unlock later. Besides such a well-known programming rule, there are many
other implicit rules in large software. For example, as shown in Figure 4.1, PostgreSQL, a
well-known open-source database server, contains an implicit programming rule that a call
to SearchSysCache must be followed by ReleaseSysCache. The reason is that the function
SearchSysCache returns a cache copy of a specified tuple; so after the caller finishes using
the tuple, it must call ReleaseSysCache to release it so that this copy can be replaced by
other data in the cache. This rule appears 209 times in PostgreSQL code. If some code
violates this rule, it causes a memory leak in PostgreSQL’s buffer cache.
postgresql-8.0.1/src/backend/catalog/dependency.c:
1733 getRelationDescription (StringInfo buffer, Oid relid)
1734 {
1735    HeapTuple  relTup;
            ......
1740    relTup = SearchSysCache  (...);
            ......
1796    ReleaseSysCache  (relTup);
1797 }
Figure 4.1: An example of function-pair rule
This rule appears 209 times in PostgreSQL code.
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postgresql-8.0.1/src/backend/commands/tablecmds.c:
5686 AlterTableCreateToastTable(Oid relOid, bool silent)
5687 {
           ......
5692   Relation  class_rel;
           ......
5853   class_rel =  heap_openr (...);
           ......
5863   simple_heap_update  (class_rel, ...);
           ......
5866   CatalogUpdateIndexes  (class_rel, ...);
           ......
5870   heap_close (class_rel, ...);
           ......
5891 }
Figure 4.2: An example for complex programming rule.
This rule contains four functions and one variable in PostgreSQL. This rule appears 68
times in PostgreSQL code.
Many programming rules are much more complex. Some rule may contain more than two
program elements, with each element being of a different type including function, variable
or data type. For example, the programming rule shown in Figure 4.2, also extracted from
PostgreSQL, contains four function calls and one variable. This rule specifies the correct
procedure to replace a tuple. Specifically, it requires that, before replacing a tuple using
simple heap update, the relation must be first opened by calling heap openr, and then call
CatalogUpdateIndexes to keep the index consistent. Furthermore, after simple heap -
update, the relation needs to be closed by calling heap close. This rule appears 68 times
in PostgreSQL.
Some complex rules may indicate variable correlations, i.e. these variables should be
accessed together or modified in a consistent manner. For example, Figure 4.3 shows that,
in the Linux code, the two variables ic.command and ic.driver should be accessed together.
This rule appears 98 times in Linux.
Implicit programming rules such as those shown above are intrinsic features of programs
and violations to these rules can result in software defects. Figure 4.4 shows such an implicit
programming rule and a violation detected by PR-Miner from the latest version of Linux.
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linux-2.6.11/drivers/isdn/hisax/config.c:
771 void ll_stop(struct IsdnCardState *cs)
772 {
773      isdn_ctrl ic;
775      ic.command = ISDN_STAT_STOP;
776      ic.driver = cs->myid;
777      cs->iif.statcallb(&ic);
779 }
Figure 4.3: An example of variable correlation
This rule appears 98 times in Linux code.
The rule shown in Figure 4.4(a) is for probing and initializing a SCSI device: the system
should call scsi host alloc to allocate a data structure for the device driver, then call
scsi add host to register the device with the SCSI stack, and finally scan the host by
scsi scan host. This is the correct procedure for probing SCSI devices in Linux. This rule
appears 27 times in Linux. However, there are two program locations missing scsi scan -
host in the latest version of Linux as shown in Figure 4.4(b), which are undetected defects
in Linux (we reported these two bugs as well as others to the Linux developers and they are
being fixed now).
Such implicit programming rules are useful information for software development. Un-
fortunately, they usually exist only in programmers’ minds as they are too tedious to be
documented manually. In addition, rule maintenance is a hard task since some rules can
change in new versions. Moreover, when the software scales up, the number of rules also in-
creases significantly. As a result, most of them are undocumented, especially in open-source
projects. Consequently, violations to these rules are easy for programmers to introduce,
especially for new programmers who are unaware of these rules. Therefore, it is highly de-
sirable if programming rules can be automatically extracted from existing source code. The
extracted rules can thereafter be used as a specification to be referenced by programmers. In
addition, it is also useful to automatically detect violations to these rules to make software
more robust.
Previous work [ECC01] by Engler, Chen and Chou has conducted a preliminary inves-
45
linux-2.6.11/drivers/scsi/3w-9xxx.c:
1964 int __devinit twa_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, ...)
1965 {
1966    struct Scsi_Host *host = NULL;
            ......
1985    host = scsi_host_alloc (...);
            ......
2036    scsi_add_host (host, &pdev->dev);
            ......
2069    scsi_scan_host (host);
            ......
2088 }
(a) Programming rule in twa probe
linux-2.6.11/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c:
688 struct scsi_id_instance_data *sbp2_alloc_device
(struct unit_directory *ud)
689 {
           ......
692     struct scsi_id_instance_data *scsi_id = NULL;
           ......
745     scsi_host =  scsi_host_alloc (...);
           ......
753     if (! scsi_add_host (scsi_host, &ud->device)) {
           ......
// scsi_scan_host (scsi_host) is missing!
764 }
(b) Violation in sbp2 alloc device
Figure 4.4: An example of a programming rule involving multiple functions
The rule {scsi host alloc, scsi add host}⇒{scsi scan host} appears 27 times in
different functions in Linux 2.6.11, one of which is shown in (a). PR-Miner detects two
violations that miss the function scsi scan host, which are potential bugs. One of the
violations is shown in (b).
tigation in this direction. They proposed a method to extract programming rules using
programmer-specified rule templates such as “function a must be paired with function b”.
The two arguments, a and b, will be fit by passing all plausible a-b pairs that are selected
based on statistical analysis and weighted by naming conventions such as the substrings
“lock” and “unlock”.
While the work above is inspiring and proposes a promising direction, it extracts only
pair-wise programming rules. Our experimental results indicate that programming rules
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with 2 elements only account for a small portion (14%) of all rules extracted by PR-Miner.
In addition, their work requires programmers to give some particular rule templates such
as “function a must be paired with function b”, which not only restricts the types of rules
extracted but also needs some specific knowledge about the target software. Furthermore,
programmers also need to give different weights to the functions and variables when fitting
elements into templates.
To significantly advance the state-of-the-art, it would be beneficial if implicit program-
ming rules, including complex ones, could be automatically extracted in a general form
without requiring prior knowledge or rule templates from programmers. To do this, a naive
method is to check every possible combination of program elements to see if they are fre-
quently used together in the target software’s code. Obviously, for large software such as
Linux that contains hundreds of thousands of functions and variables, such a naive method
would result in exponential complexity. Therefore, an efficient method needs to be developed
to achieve the goal.
4.1.2 Contributions of PR-Miner
This chapter presents a novel method called PR-Miner (Programming Rule Miner), that uses
a data mining technique to automatically extract general programming rules from software
code written in an industrial programming language such as C 1 and detect violations with
little effort from programmers. More specifically, our work makes the following two major
contributions:
1. We propose a general method to automatically extract implicit programming rules from
large software code. Benefiting from data mining techniques, PR-Miner can extract
thousands of programming rules from software such as Linux with 3500 files and a total
of 3 million lines of code within 1 minute. Compared with the previous work [ECC01]
1Similar to other automatic specification generation tools, we assume that the software has been reason-
ably well tested and runs correctly most of the time.
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that extracts only function-pair based rules, PR-Miner extracts substantially more
rules. This is because PR-Miner has substantially generalized Engler et al’s work in
the following two aspects:
— General method: Our technique for extracting programming rules is more gen-
eral. PR-Miner can automatically extract programming rules from software code with-
out any prior knowledge about the software or requiring any annotation, templates or
weight assignments from programmers. Additionally, by replacing the front-end parser,
PR-Miner can be easily modified to work with programs written in other programming
languages such as Java.
— General rules: The programming rules extracted by PR-Miner are more general.
Since it does not limit the programming rules using any fixed templates, PR-Miner can
extract rules in general forms and with multiple program elements of different types
including functions, variables, data types, etc. As a result, it not only extracts simple
pair-wise rules, but also extracts more complex rules like the examples shown above.
2. We also propose an efficient algorithm to detect violations to the extracted program-
ming rules. PR-Miner has detected many violations to the extracted rules in the latest
versions of Linux and PostgreSQL within 1 minute. Among the top 60 violations re-
ported by PR-Miner, many of them have been confirmed as bugs, including 16 bugs
in Linux, 6 bugs in PostgreSQL and 1 bug in Apache. These bugs are currently being
fixed by corresponding developers after we reported. Most of these bugs are semantic
bugs that violate complex programming rules that contain more than 2 elements and
are thereby difficult for previous tools to detect.
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4.2 Design of PR-Miner
PR-Miner has two major functionalities: automatically extracting implicit programming
rules, and automatically detecting violations to the extracted programming rules. The
flowchart of PR-Miner is shown in Figure 4.5. This section first gives the main idea of
PR-Miner, and then presents how PR-Miner automatically extracts programming rules from
source code, and how it detects rule violations and prunes false positives.
4.2.1 Main Idea
The high-level idea of PR-Miner in automatic rule extraction is to find associations among
elements (e.g., function, variable, data type) by looking for elements that are frequently
used together in source code. For example, calls to spin lock irqsave and spin unlock -
irqrestore in Linux appear together within the same function for more than 3600 times,
which indicates that spin unlock irqrestore following spin lock irqsave is very likely
to be an implicit programming rule. By identifying which elements are used together fre-
quently in the source code, such correlated elements can be considered a programming rule
with relatively high confidence. Of course, as described in the introduction, a naive imple-
mentation of this high-level idea is infeasible since it needs to examine all possible element
combinations.
In order to efficiently find program element correlations, PR-Miner converts the problem
into a frequent itemset mining problem by first parsing the software source code as shown
in Figure 4.5. Each program element is hashed into a number, then a function definition
is mapped into an itemset (a set of numbers), which is written as a row into the itemset
database. As a result, the whole program is converted into a database that contains many
itemsets. By mining this database using a frequent itemset mining algorithm such as FPclose,
we can find the frequent sub-itemsets that appear for many times. These frequent sub-
itemsets can then be used to infer programming rules.
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For a frequent sub-itemset discovered by the mining algorithm, we call the set of the cor-
responding program elements a programming pattern, which indicates that the program
elements are correlated and frequently used together. For example, FPclose can find that
{spin lock irqsave, spin unlock irqrestore} is a programming pattern since it appears
in the Linux source code more than 3600 times.
Note that programming patterns are different from programming rules. For example, the
above pattern may lead to one or two of the following programming rules:
{spin lock irqsave}⇒{spin unlock irqrestore}
{spin unlock irqrestore}⇒{spin lock irqsave}
The first rule says that whenever the program calls spin lock irqsave, it should also
call spin unlock irqrestore, while the second says that whenever the program calls spin -
unlock irqrestore, it should also call spin lock irqsave. These two are different rules,
and not all of them definitely hold, even if the pattern has appeared for many times.
Therefore, after programming patterns are extracted using the frequent itemset mining
technique, PR-Miner needs to generate programming rules from the extracted patterns. The
main idea of the rule generation process is to find the number of cases that contain the
items on the left but not those on the right. For example, in the above example, we need
to find out how many cases that spin lock irqsave appears but spin unlock irqrestore
does not and vice versa. After generating the programming rules, PR-Miner stores them
in specification files so that programmers can examine them and also use them later as
references. Section 4.2.3 describes the rule generation process in detail.
After programming rules are generated, PR-Miner automatically detects violations in
source code. It also automatically prunes false positives and ranks violations in the report
so that programmers only need to examine top ranked violations. The violation detection
process is based on the idea that a programming rule is usually followed in most cases and
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violations occur only in a small percentage of cases. Section 4.2.4 describes the detection
process in more detail.
Using closed frequent itemset mining algorithms such as FPclose provides PR-Miner
several benefits: (1) Generality. Close frequent itemset mining algorithms do not limit the
number of items in frequent sub-itemsets and also does not require any rule templates. Fur-
thermore, the items in a frequent sub-itemset are not necessarily adjacent in the supporting
itemset, i.e. they can be far apart from each other. (2) Time efficiency. Data mining al-
gorithms such as FPclose are usually very efficient since they strive to avoid scanning data
too many times by eliminating redundant computation as much as possible. Additionally,
since FPclose generates only closed frequent itemsets, it can avoid generating an exponential
number of sub-itemsets. (3) Space efficiency. From closed frequent sub-itemsets, we can find
closed rules, rules that subsume many other rules with the same support. Take the item-
set database D = {{a, b, c, d, e}, {a, b, d, e, f}, {a, b, d, g}, {a, c, h, i}} described in Section 2.1
as an example. FPclose finds a closed frequent sub-itemset: {a, b, d}:3. From the closed
frequent sub-itemset we can have the following 6 closed rules with support 3:
{a} ⇒ {b, d} with confidence 3/4=75%
{b} ⇒ {a, d} with confidence 100%
{d} ⇒ {a, b} with confidence 100%
{a, b} ⇒ {d} with confidence 100%
{a, d} ⇒ {b} with confidence 100%
{b, d} ⇒ {a} with confidence 100%
Other rules are subsumed by the above closed rules. For example, the sub-rule {a} ⇒
{b} with confidence 75% is subsumed by the first closed rule. Using closed rules not only
saves space, but also significantly reduces the number of rules that need to be examined or












Storing rules into specification files
Examined & referenced by programmers
Figure 4.5: Flowchart of PR-Miner
4.2.2 Extracting Programming Patterns
Parsing Source Code
The main purpose of parsing source code is to build an itemset database in order to convert
the programming pattern extraction problem into a frequent itemset mining problem. PR-
Miner does this by using a modified GCC compiler [St05] as the parser to convert each
function definition into a set of numbers. The current prototype of PR-Miner only works
for C, but it can be easily extended to other programming languages by replacing the GCC
front ends.
In order to convert the source code into an itemset database, we need to address the
following issues: (1) How to parse the source code? (2) What elements in the source code
should be converted? (3) How to represent elements using numbers?
To parse the source code, PR-Miner first uses the GCC front end to obtain the interme-
diate representation. The intermediate representation is stored in a tree data structure, with
each node representing various types of elements in source code including identifier name,
data type name, keyword, operator, control structure, and so on. In order to convert a func-
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tion to an itemset, PR-Miner traverses the representation tree of this function, and hashes
each selected elements to a number. By combining the hash values of all selected elements
in a function, this function is mapped to an itemset. Then the itemsets of all functions
construct the itemset database to input to the mining algorithm FPclose. The reason to
convert a function instead of a basic block to an itemset is that most programming rules
usually occur within the scope of a function. Of course, some rules can span across multi-
ple functions. But mining these rules is much harder as it requires deeper inter-procedural
analysis.
Not every program element in the intermediate representation is converted into a number
because some elements can cause noise. For example, keywords and simple data types such
as int appear in almost every function. They are less likely lead to interesting programming
rules. In addition, including them in the itemset would significantly increase the computation
of frequent itemset mining. Therefore, PR-Miner does not hash such elements into numbers.
Furthermore, the same programming rule involving local variables may use different vari-
able names at different code segments. For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4.4,
the return value of calls to the same function scsi host alloc can be assigned to different
local variables such as host and scsi host. If we hash them into different numbers, the
rule might be missed. In order to catch such kinds of rules, we need to use the common
characteristics of these local variables such as their data types to represent them so that
they are still hashed to the same number in the itemset database. For example, the local
variable class ref in the code segment in Figure 4.2 is represented by the hash value of its
data type Relation instead of its name class ref.
Another problem when hashing identifiers to numbers is name collisions. Different types
of identifiers with the same name would be hashed to the same number, causing false positives
in the generated frequent sub-itemsets. In order to eliminate such name collisions, PR-Miner
hashes different types of identifiers into different values. To do that, PR-Miner first prefixes
every identifier name based on its type, and then hashes the prefixed name to a number.
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For example, a function call to lock would be prefixed with “F-” and then be hashed to a
number corresponding to “F-lock”, while a global variable with the same name lock would
be prefixed with “G-” and be hashed to a number corresponding to “G-lock”.
Similarly, different record structures may use the same name for their fields, which is
quite common in large software. For example, the names, “next” and “prev” are commonly
used as field names in many different structures. Such name collisions would result in false
positives of frequent sub-itemsets. In order to differentiate fields of the same name but
in different record structures, PR-Miner attaches the associated record type to every field
name. For example, the fields next in the record types tree and list are considered as
“D-tree.R-next” and “D-list.R-next”, respectively, and so they can be hashed into different
numbers to avoid collision.
The hash function PR-Miner uses is “hashpjw” [ASU86], chosen for its low collision rate.
Our experiments show that its collision rate is low enough for frequent sub-itemset mining.
Additionally, if conflict-free mapping is needed, we can first parse the whole source code so
that we can create a symbol table for all possible identifiers, and then convert elements into
numbers based on their indexes to the symbol table. Since it takes one more pass of the
source code and our hashing method already has a low collision rate, we do not use this
method.
Table 4.1 shows how PR-Miner converts a function into an itemset. After parsing the
source code, prefixing and hashing selected elements into numbers, PR-Miner converts the
definition of function twa probe into the itemset {92, 39, 41, 68, 56, 36, ...}.
Mining for Programming Patterns
After PR-Miner parses the source code and generates an itemset database, it applies the
closed frequent itemset mining algorithm, FPclose, on the database to find closed frequent
sub-itemsets. As we describe in Section 2.1, if a set of numbers appear together in any
itemsets for more than a specified threshold number (min support) of times, this sub-itemset
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linux-2.6.11/drivers/scsi/3w-9xxx.c: L1964 - 2088
int __devinit twa_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,...)
{
  struct Scsi_Host * host = NULL;
  ......




































Table 4.1: Example of parsing a function
The italic identifiers in source code are selected to analyze. They are prefixed with the
types as shown in the second column. Each preprocessed identifiers is then hashed to a
number. Only the last two digits of hash values are shown for simplicity.
is considered frequent. Let us consider the example shown in Table 4.1. For simplicity, let
us denote these three functions as add, alloc and scan. The sub-itemset {39, 68, 36, 92}
appears in totally 27 itemsets in the itemset database converted from Linux code. Suppose
that min support is set as 15. FPclose will find a frequent sub-itemset {39, 68, 36, 92} with
a support of 27, which means that the corresponding functions alloc, add and scan, and
the data type Scsi Host are used together for 27 times. Therefore, these four elements are
correlated with each other and are thereby outputted as a programming pattern, which is
then used to generate programming rules in the next step.
Since FPclose generates only closed frequent itemsets whose support is larger than the
support of its super-itemset, it does not generate redundant sub-patterns with the same
support. In the above example, {39, 68, 36} is also a frequent sub-itemset. However, since
it is not closed, i.e., it is included in its super-itemset {39, 68, 36, 92} with the same support
27, we do not need to output it.
It is not enough to know only the closed programming patterns and their support values
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(i.e., how many times the pattern occurs). It would be more helpful for programmers if we
also record the functions in which each extracted pattern occurs. Such information is also
needed later in violation detection in order to know which function violates an extracted
rule. Unfortunately, the original algorithm FPclose and any other frequent itemset mining
algorithms were not designed exactly for our purpose. They only output the support values
for each discovered pattern but not their supporting itemsets. Therefore, we enhance FPclose
to address this problem by also maintaining the supporting itemsets during the mining
process. In the above example, PR-Miner outputs the closed frequent sub-itemset {39, 68,
36, 92} with the supporting itemset that corresponds to the 27 functions that contain this
programming pattern.
4.2.3 Generating Programming Rules
As we explained briefly in Section 4.1, extracting only programming patterns is not enough
because a pattern may lead to many different rules. Therefore, we also need to generate
rules from patterns based on conditional probabilities.
A Naive Method
A naive method to generate programming rules from extracted patterns is to divide the items
in each closed frequent sub-itemset into two parts and then calculate the confidence. In other
words, from a closed frequent sub-itemset I, we can compute the confidence for every possible
association rules X ⇒ Y , where X and Y are subsets of I [AS94, HGN00]. The support
of such a rule is equal to the support of I, while the confidence of a rule is the conditional
probability, i.e. support(I)/support(X), where support(X) is the number of occurrences of
sub-itemset X in the itemset database, which also equals to the maximum support of any
closed frequent itemset that contains X. Basically, the confidence indicates the conditional
probability that if X occurs, the likelihood for Y to occur. Rules with confidence smaller
than a specified threshold (e.g. 90%) are pruned. And the remaining rules are outputted to
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the specification files to be examined and referenced by programmers.
Let us consider the above example again. After PR-Miner finds a programming pattern
{alloc, add, scan, Scsi Host}. From this pattern, the naive method can generate 14
different possible rules by partitioning these three functions and the data type into 2 subsets
in all possible ways such as {add}⇒{alloc, scan, Scsi Host}, and {add, alloc}⇒{scan,
Scsi Host}, and so forth. All these rules have the support of 27. From the programming
patterns discovered by FPclose, we know that the support for {add} is 37, and the support
for {add, alloc} is 29. Therefore, the confidences for these 2 rules are 27/37 = 72.9% and
27/29 = 93.1%, respectively. The confidences for the other 12 rules can also be computed
similarly. So if we set the confidence threshold to be 90%, the first rule {add}⇒{alloc,
scan, Scsi Host} is pruned, while the second rule is outputted.
The biggest problem with the naive method is that it needs to examine all possible rules
from each mined patterns. A programming pattern with k elements can generate up to
(2k − 2) rules, which is impractical for long patterns. For example, our evaluation with
large software code shows that some programming patterns are composed of more than 20
elements. Therefore, it is time and space inefficient to use this naive method to generate
rules from patterns.
Generating Closed Rules
Instead of examining all possible programming rules from a mined pattern like in the naive
method, PR-Miner examines only closed rules. As we explained in Section 4.1, it is enough
to generate only closed rules since other rules are subsumed by closed rules.
To further reduce the number of outputted rules and speed up the generation as well
as the violation detection processes, PR-Miner stores closed rules in condensed format.
Formally, the condensed format for a closed frequent sub-itemset I is:
I : s|{C1 : s1|s1 > s} . . . {Cm : sm|sm > s}
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where C1 . . . Cm are all subsets of I whose supports (s1 . . . sm) are different from I’s. Ob-
viously, s1 . . . sm are all larger than s. Such condensed format can represent all the closed
rules derived from I and their confidences can be computed easily. For a closed rule X ⇒ Y
derived from I, if X equals to Ci (i.e. a subset of I with a support larger than I), the
confidence of the rule is s/si; otherwise, the confidence of the rule is 100%.
For example, suppose FPclose extracts two closed frequent sub-itemsets: {a} : 4 and
{a, b, d} : 3. The condensed format that represents all the closed rules derived from {a, b, d}
is
{a, b, d} : 3|{a : 4}
It explicitly expresses that the rule {a} ⇒ {b, d} has confidence 3/4=75%, and also infers
that any of the other 5 closed rules, such as {a, b} ⇒ {d} has confidence 100%.
Now the rule generation problem becomes how to find out all of the subset Ci that has
a support si larger than s. Since the support of Ci is larger than s, it indicates that Ci
should be contained in another closed frequent sub-itemset (based on the definition of closed
frequent sub-itemset). Since Ci may include in multiple other closed frequent sub-itemset,
PR-Miner needs to find the one with the maximum support.
To achieve this goal, PR-Miner uses a clever idea that converts this problem back to a
frequent sub-itemset mining again. In other words, PR-Miner uses FPclose one more time to
find common sub-itemsets from frequent sub-itemsets generated by the first pass of FPclose.
Doing such will find all common subsets among the closed frequent sub-itemsets generated
in the first pass. Let CommonSub denote all the common subsets generated by the second
pass of FPclose. If a subset Ci of I is included in CommonSub, we can immediately find
out which super-itemset of Ci has the maximum support. The support of this super-itemset
must be equal to the support of Ci based on the definition of closed frequent sub-itemsets.
We can easily prove this by contradiction. Note that the basic operation we need is to
compute the common subsets for each pair of the closed frequent sub-itemsets. Therefore,
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we can apply the frequent itemset mining algorithm again on the closed frequent sub-itemsets
with minimum support of 2. Our algorithm ClosedRules for generating closed rules in
condensed format is shown in Figure 4.6.
Algorithm: ClosedRules(I)
Input: I = {Ik|1 ≤ k ≤ n},
Ik has 3 fields 〈Fk, sk, Ek〉;
Output: The closed rules R in condensed format.
1: Sort I by supports in descending order such that
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sn
2: Mine common closed frequent sub-itemsets from I:
C ← FPclose({Fi|i = 1, 2, ..., n}, 2),
where C = {Ci|1 ≤ i ≤ m} and







3: for i = 1, 2, ..., m
4: Denote E ′i = {ij|1 ≤ j ≤ s
′
i}
5: for j = 2, 3, ..., s′i
6: if si1 > sij
7: Insert F ′i : si1 to sub-itemset Iij in R
Figure 4.6: Algorithm ClosedRules
Generating closed rules R in condensed format from closed frequent itemsets I mined from
the first step explained in Section 4.2.2. The close frequent mining algorithm FPclose
takes an itemset database and the minimum support threshold as input, and outputs the
closed frequent sub-itemsets, each of which has three fields 〈Fi, si, Ei〉, where Fi is the
frequent itemset itself, si is its support, Ei is the indexes of its supporting itemsets, and Ei




i〉 have the same meanings but are
generated by the second pass of FPclose (line 2) to a database that consists of all closed
frequent sub-itemsets, i.e. {Fi|i = 1, 2, ..., n}.
In the ClosedRules algorithm, it first sorts the frequent itemsets I mined from FP-
close (line 1) so that it can quickly locate the frequent itemset with the maximal support
for any common sub-itemset. In line 2, it calls FPclose with minimum support of 2 to find
out all common sub-itemsets C from I. For each common sub-itemset Ci (line 3), Close-
dRules inserts it with its support to the corresponding rule of condensed format as follows.
E ′i includes the indexes of all Ci’s supporting itemsets in I. The first supporting itemset
Ii1 has the maximum support for Ci, because all indexes in E
′
i are sorted based on their
corresponding itemset’s support. For the other supporting itemset Iij (line 5), if its support
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sij is smaller than si1 (line 6), Ci is inserted into the subset of the rule for the closed frequent
itemset Iij . This way, with only one pass it can insert Ci into all rules that are super-itemsets
of Ci but have smaller support than Ci.
ClosedRules performs much better than the naive algorithm in terms of space and time,
because it does not need to examine all possible rules generated from extracted programming
patterns.
By calling ClosedRules on the closed frequent sub-itemsets that correspond to the
extracted programming patterns, PR-Miner obtains the closed rules in the condensed format
expressed in numbers, and then it maps the closed rules back to programming rules and stores
them into a specification file. The programmers can then validate the programming rules
so that later they can use them as specifications, and also new programmers can read them
when they start coding to avoid mistakes.
Since PR-Miner extracts programming rules based on occurrences, some false positives
may be introduced if some elements only coincidentally appear together for many times in
the source code. However, a rule with larger supports can be more believable. Therefore,
PR-Miner ranks the rules based on supports: programmers can examine those rules that
are ranked in the top 100 or 500. Furthermore, as we explained early, rules with confidence
lower than the specified threshold (e.g. 90%) are pruned. Additionally, some other ranking
method such as giving weights for different elements as in Engler et al’s work [ECC01] can
also be applied.
4.2.4 Detecting Violations to Extracted Rules
Based on the programming rules generated from the previous step, PR-Miner can find poten-
tial bugs by detecting violations to these rules. The main idea is that the programming rules
usually hold for most cases and violations happen only occasionally. Take the potential bug
detected by PR-Miner in Figure 4.4 as an example. The function call to scan should follow
alloc and add as the programming rule indicates. This rule appears 27 times in Linux, but
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there are 2 cases violating this rule because scan is missing.
As shown in Figure 4.5, PR-Miner first detects violations to the extracted programming
rules, then prunes the false violations using inter-procedural analysis, and finally ranks the
violations in the error report.
Detecting Violations
In order to detect violations to the programming rules, a naive method is to generate all
possible programming rules and then check them upon the source code one by one. As we
discussed in Section 4.2.3, there would be an exponential number of rules that need to be
checked.
Fortunately, it is unnecessary to check all programming rules. First, if the rule has a low
confidence, it is already pruned in the rule-generation step. In other words, if the confidence
threshold is t, any rules with confidence smaller than t are discarded. Second, if the rule has
100% confidence, it indicates that there is no violation for the rule. Therefore, we only need
to check the rules with confidence in the range [t, 100%).
The main idea of the violation detection process is straightforward. For example, if a
rule {a, b} ⇒ {d} has a support of 100 and {a, b} has a support of 101, there is only one
out of 101 cases that has {a, b} but not {d}, which indicates that this case violates the rule
{a, b} ⇒ {d}. In other words, this case is likely to be a bug. But if {a, b} has a support of
200, the rule {a, b} ⇒ {d} will be pruned as its confidence is only 50%.
Since PR-Miner stores generated programming rules in the condensed format that ex-
plicitly indicates which rules have confidence less than 100% but greater than the specified
threshold t, we can easily figure out which rules have violations. Even more efficiently,
PR-Miner detects violations during the same process when it generates the programming
rules by calling ClosedRules as shown in Figure 4.6. To do that, PR-Miner computes the
confidence for the rule F ′i ⇒ (Fij − F
′
i ) in the loop of line 5 as c = sij/si1 . If t ≤ c < 1, it
indicates that there are violations to this rule. The violations can be easily figured out by
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comparing the supporting itemsets for the closed frequent sub-itemsets Ii1 and Iij as follows.
Fi1 contains the common sub-itemset F
′
i , but it does not contain (Fij − F
′
i ). It means that
some supporting itemsets in Ei1 violate the rule F
′
i ⇒ (Fij − F
′
i ). On the other hand, this
rule is supported by the supporting itemsets Eij for Fij . Therefore, the itemsets in Ei1 but
not in Eij violate this rule, and so the corresponding functions of the itemsets violate the
programming rule.
Pruning False Violations
The violation detection above can result in false positives if the elements in a programming
rule span across multiple functions. The reason is that PR-Miner detects violations using
only intra-procedural analysis because, as described in Section 4.2.2, each itemset in the
database corresponds to a function definition. Suppose in an example with a function-pair
(lock and unlock) rule, unlock is called inside a function F but lock is not. Instead, F calls
another function try lock that calls lock. Without inter-procedural analysis, PR-Miner
would report that F contains a violation of missing lock, even though F contains lock in its
callee.
In order to prune the above false violations, PR-Miner performs an inter-procedural
checking. It first checks the callees’ paths for each function that contains violations. For
each violation of rule X ⇒ Y in function F , PR-Miner checks whether every item y ∈ Y is in
the functions F1, ..., Fn called by F . As shown in Figure 4.7(a), we can follow the calling path
more deeply by checking the functions called by callees F1, ..., Fn in F . If the missing items
are in any of the calling paths, it is a false violation. For time efficiency, PR-Miner limits
the checking depth. Since PR-Miner outputs all function calls in each function definition as
described in Section 4.2.2, it is easy to follow the calling path during checking.
Besides callees, PR-Miner also checks the callers to prune false positives. In the example
above, there is also a violation in the function try lock because lock is in try lock but





















(b) Checking in all callers
Figure 4.7: Checking the call paths for pruning false violations
the missing items are in the caller functions’ paths as shown in Figure 4.7(b). In order to
check the call path backwards, PR-Miner maintains a caller list for each function F that
consists of the indexes of the functions that call F. If the missing items for function F are in
the paths of all of its callers, it is a false violation.
Ranking and Reporting Bugs
After PR-Miner detects rule violations and prunes false positives, it ranks all remaining
violations and reports them to programmers.
PR-Miner ranks the violations based on the confidence of the violated rules. Since a
function may contain several violations, PR-Miner groups all violations of the same function
together, and the violation with the highest confidence is assigned as the confidence of the
violated function. The confidence of a violated function can be considered the possibility
that the function has bugs. In the current version of PR-Miner, it simply ranks the bugs by
the confidence. Because several functions may have the same violation, the potential bugs
in these functions are strongly correlated. Therefore, some other advanced ranking schemes





We have evaluated PR-Miner with the latest versions of Linux, PostgreSQL, and the Apache
HTTP Server. The numbers of files, lines of code (LOC) and functions are shown in Ta-
ble 4.2.
PR-Miner takes three parameters: min support , the confidence threshold, and maximal
checking path depth. By default, we set the min support as 15, the confidence threshold as
90%, and the maximal depth of call path as 3 for pruning false violations.
The parser for PR-Miner is GCC 3.3.4 [St05] with a small modifications. In our experi-
ments, we run PR-Miner on an Intel Xeon 1.5 GHz machine with 4GB memory and Linux
2.4.20 system.
4.3.2 Extracting Implicit Programming Rules
Table 4.3 shows the number of closed rules discovered by PR-Miner in the evaluated software.
Rules that have confidence lower than the threshold (90%) are pruned automatically by PR-
Miner and are thereby not included in the results reported in this section. From the closed
rules, programmers can easily infer other rules subsumed by these closed rules. These closed
rules can be classified into three categories: function-function (F-F) rules, variable-variable
(V-V) rules, and function-variable (F-V) rules. F-F rules involve only functions, V-V rules
involve only variables (including fields in structure) or their data types, while F-V rules
involve both functions and variables.
Software version #C files LOC #functions
Linux 2.6.11 3,538 3,037,403 73,607
PostgreSQL 8.0.1 409 381,192 6,964
Apache 2.0.53 160 84,724 1,912
Table 4.2: Software evaluated in our experiments.
64
Software Total F-F V-V F-V
Linux 32,283 1,075 8,883 22,325
PostgreSQL 6,128 379 687 5,062
Apache 283 33 92 158
Table 4.3: The number of closed rules extracted by PR-Miner
Notice that all F-V rules that contain more than two elements also include F-F and/or V-V
rules as their sub-rules.
Our results show that a large number of implicit, undocumented programming rules
can be effectively extracted from source code by PR-Miner without any priori knowledge
or annotations/specifications from programmers. For example, PR-Miner extracts a total
of 32,283 implicit, undocumented closed programming rules from Linux. It would be very
difficult for programmers to manually specify these many programming rules. PR-Miner
effectively relieves such burden from programmers by efficiently and automatically extracts
such rules from source code.
The results also show that around 88.3–96.7% rules involve variables. For example, there
are around 9000 V-V rules in Linux, along with a large number of variable correlations con-
tained in F-V rules. Comparing with the previous studies such as Engler et al’s work [ECC01]
that do not consider rules about variable correlations, PR-Miner can extract substantially
more programming rules.
Supports of Programming Rules
Figure 4.8 shows the support distribution of closed rules extracted by PR-Miner in Linux. As
expected, the number of closed rules decreases when the corresponding support increases.
The decreasing rate is approximately exponential from 15 to 80 (notice that Y-axis is in
logarithmic scale). Since the rules with larger support are more “believable”, programmers
can increase min support to improve the quality of rules, or choose only those top ranked
closed programming rules (Extracted rules are ranked by their supports).
The figure also shows that some rules have large supports, strongly validating our obser-
vation that programmers follow many implicit programming rules in writing software. For
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example, there are 1442 rules with supports larger than 100 in Linux, and the rule with the
largest support is the function pair of spin lock irqsave and spin unlock irqrestore,
which has a support of 3656.
Figure 4.8: Distribution of rule support in the Linux code
Notice that Y-axis is in logarithmic scale.
Rule Size
Each programming rule contains several elements such as functions, variables and data types.
The number of elements in a rule is called the rule size. Figure 4.9 shows the distribution
of rule size in Linux. Around 4200 closed rules contain only 2 elements, which accounts for
14% of all closed rules. On the other hand, 9% of the closed rules have even more than
10 elements. For example, PR-Miner found a rule that contains 12 program elements and
appears 38 times in Linux, which is followed when the system registers for a PCMCIA device.
The above results, along with the results shown on Table 4.3, indicate the generality of
PR-Miner over the previous work [ECC01] because PR-Miner does not constrain the rule























Figure 4.9: Distribution of rule size in the Linux code.
4.3.3 Detecting Violations
PR-Miner has reported many violations of programming rules in the evaluated software.
We have manually examined the top 60 violations to differentiate bugs from false positives.
Confirmed bugs have been reported to the corresponding developer community and are
currently being fixed by developers. The numbers of the verified bugs are shown in Table 4.4.
Currently, we are still inspecting the violation report and more bugs will be confirmed. More
specifically, we have validated 16 bugs in Linux, 6 bugs in PostgreSQL, and 1 in the Apache
HTTP Server. Almost all of these bugs are semantic bugs instead of those simple bugs such
as buffer overflow, data races, etc. and are thereby difficult to be detected by existing bug
detection tools. In addition, most of these bugs violate complex rules that involve more than
2 elements, so it is difficult for the previous work [ECC01] to detect them.
Notice that we directly apply the programming rules mined by PR-Miner in violation
detection without having programmers validate the extracted rules. Therefore, false program-
ming rules might result in false positives in violation report. If programmers can validate
those topped ranked rules and prune false rules, the number of false positives generated by
PR-Miner in violation detection should be smaller than those presented in Table 4.4.
Even though our inter-procedural pruning method can prune a lot of false positives in
violation report, many false positives still exist. Even for the strong function-pair rules with
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high confidence such as lock-unlock, there are still a few violations that are false positives.
For example, the function spin lock bh (in Linux kernel/spinlock.c) includes a call to spin -
lock irqsave but not spin unlock irqrestore because spin lock bh is to provide locking
functionality and thereby does not need unlocking in it. Such false positives can be pruned
if we can also conduct deeper inter-procedural analysis. In addition, combining with some
dynamic checking methods would be helpful to further prune these false positives.
However, even these false positives are still useful for automatic specification and an-
notation of function interfaces. In the example above, we can know the unlock function
should be called somewhere after calling spin lock bh. Therefore, we can automatically
annotate the function spin lock bh with such assumption. There are many cases that are
more complex than this example. For example, PR-Miner reports a violation to a rule that
says: if fields counter and len in a structure sk buff are modified, the function kfree skb
should be called. This rule appears 480 times in Linux. It indicates that if these two fields
are accessed, some memory is allocated for the data structure of sk buff and thereafter it
should be freed. However, there is one violation of this rule in the function skb clone in
the file net/core/skbuff.c with confidence 480/481 = 99.8%. Although it is a false violation,
it still indicates that after the function skb clone is called, kfree skb also should be called
later in order to free the memory; otherwise, it would cause memory leak. Therefore, this
violation can be used to automatically annotate the interface of the function skb clone.
Software Inspected (top 60) Uninspected
Bugs Specification False Positives
Linux 16 20 24 1387
PostgreSQL 6 9 45 87
Apache 1 0 6 0
Table 4.4: Violations detected by PR-Miner
We have inspected the top 60 violations in the violation report. The inspected violations
are classified into 3 categories: real bugs that have been confirmed, potential usage for
function interface annotation, and false positives. Uninspected means that we are unable

















































(b) Effects of confidence threshold on the
number of violated functions
Figure 4.10: Effects of parameter settings on violation detection.
Sensitivity of Parameters Figure 4.10 shows the effect of the parameter settings on the
number of violated functions reported by PR-Miner. From Figure 4.10(a), we can see that
the number of violated functions decreases when min support increases. However, comparing
with the exponential decreasing rate of the number of rules in Figure 4.8, it decreases much
more slowly. The reason is that some violations of different rules may indicate the same
error but with different confidence and support. This is desirable for debugging because even
though the number of rules increases significantly when min support decreases, the number of
violated functions only increases almost linearly so that it will not increase the false positive
rate too much. Furthermore, multiple violations that indicate the same potential bug can
strengthen its confidence, so it would be helpful for ranking to combine these violations.
Similarly, the number of violated functions decreases linearly with the confidence thresh-
old as shown in Figure 4.10(b). The results indicate that the programmer can adjust both
parameters in order to generate a reasonable number of errors in the report and verify them.
With a fixed confidence threshold, ranking the error reports by confidence can also relieve
the programmer to verify the potential bugs.
False Positives Although PR-Miner can effectively detect violations and potential bugs,
it turns out that some of the reports are false. By analyzing the results, most of the false
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positives are cause by the following reasons:
• False programming rules Currently, PR-Miner detects violations using all of the
rules mined from source code without verification by programmers. Since some pro-
gramming elements coincidentally appear together for many times, they may be in-
correctly considered as programming patterns, which result in false rules. In order to
eliminate the false positives in bug detection cause by such false rules, programming
rules should be verified by programmers before they are used for violation detection.
• Incomplete programming rules When PR-Miner parses the source code and con-
verts it into the data for mining, it does not keep the information of branch condi-
tions. However, some rules are sensitive to branch conditions. For example, the rule
malloc⇒free is not a complete rule because after malloc is called, if the allocation
fails, it does not need to call free. The complete rule for this case should be: malloc
and return is not null ⇒ free. In order to get the complete rules containing branch
conditions, when PR-Miner converts source code, it should also tokenize the condi-
tions. However, it is a challenging problem because it is hard to present the accurate
information of a branch.
• Inaccurate source code analysis Since PR-Miner does not consider any path or
context information, it can also cause false positives in violation detection. For exam-
ple, for the rule malloc⇒free, malloc is called only in one of the branches upon some
special condition, and in most of the other conditions, there is no need to call free.
Further, the inter-procedure pruner in PR-Miner does not consider function pointers,
so it cannot get the exact call graph when it does pruning.
4.3.4 Time and Space Overheads
PR-Miner can extract programming rules and detect violations in large software very effi-
ciently. The execution time and space overhead is shown in Table 5.5.
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It takes less than 1 minute for PR-Miner to extract more than 32,000 closed rules in
Linux with more than 3500 files, and only several seconds for PostgreSQL and Apache. The
results also show that PR-Miner can efficiently detect violations. For example, it takes less
than 1 minute to detect violations.
PR-Miner is also space-efficient for rule extraction and violation detection. For exam-
ple, it takes less than 500MB for Linux, 25MB for PostgreSQL and only 7MB for Apache.
Therefore, PR-Miner is a practical method to extract programming rules from large software
in just an ordinary PC machine.
Software Extracting rules Detecting violations
Time(s) Space(MB) Time(s) Space(MB)
Linux 42 441 46 303
PostgreSQL 5 25 4 14
Apache 1 7.3 1 6.2
Table 4.5: Execution time and memory space of PR-Miner
4.4 Summary
This chapter presents a general technique called PR-Miner that uses frequent itemset min-
ing to efficiently and automatically extract implicit, undocumented programming rules and
detect violations in large software code written in C with little efforts from programmers.
The rules extracted by PR-Miner are in general forms, including both simple pair-wise rules
and complex ones with multiple elements of different types.
We have evaluated PR-Miner with the latest versions of large software code including
Linux, Apache HTTP Server and PostgreSQL with up to 3 million lines of code. PR-Miner
takes only 1–42 seconds to extract more than 32,000 closed programming rules and also only
1–46 seconds to detect violations. In addition, PR-Miner has detected many violations to the
extracted rules. Among the top 60 violations reported by PR-Miner, 16 bugs are confirmed
in the latest version of Linux, 6 in PostgreSQL and 1 in Apache. Many of these bugs are
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currently being fixed by developers after we reported them. Most of these bugs violate






Copying and pasting code is a common practice in software development. In order to
reduce programming effort and shorten programming time, programmers prefer reusing a
piece of code via copy-paste rather than rewriting similar code from scratch. Recent stud-
ies [Bak95, DRD99, KG03] have shown that a large portion of code is duplicated in soft-
ware. For example, Kapser and Godfrey [KG03], using a copy-paste detection tool called
CCFinder [KKI02], found that 12% of the Linux file system code (279K lines) was involved
in code cloning activity. Baker [Bak95] found that in the complete source of the X Window
system (714K lines), 19% of the code was identified as duplicates.
Using abstractions such as functions and macros to remove this duplication might improve
software maintenance; however, much duplication will likely remain, for two possible reasons.
First, some changes are usually necessary, and copy-paste is much easier and faster than
abstraction. Another reason is that functions may impose higher overhead. However, the
psychological reasons for large percentage of existing copy-pasted code are beyond the scope
of our work.
Copy-pasted code is prone to introducing errors. For example, Chou et al. [CYC+01]
found that in a single source file under the Linux drivers/i2o directory, 34 out of 35 errors
were caused by copy-paste. One of the errors was copied in 10 places and another in 24. They
also showed that many operating system errors are not independent because programmers
are ignorant of system restrictions in copy-pasted code. In our study, we have detected 28
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( linux-2.6.6/arch/sparc64/prom/memory.c )
 68 void __init prom_meminit(void)
 69 {
           ......
 92     for(iter=0; iter<num_regs; iter++) {
 93        prom_phys_total[iter].start_adr =
 94            prom_reg_memlist[iter].phys_addr;
 95        prom_phys_total[iter].num_bytes =
 96            prom_reg_memlist[iter].reg_size;
 97        prom_phys_total[iter].theres_more =
 98            &prom_phys_total[iter+1];
 99     }
           ......
111     for(iter=0; iter<num_regs; iter++) {
112        prom_prom_taken[iter].start_adr =
113            prom_reg_memlist[iter].phys_addr;
114        prom_prom_taken[iter].num_bytes =
115            prom_reg_memlist[iter].reg_size;
116        prom_prom_taken[iter].theres_more =
117            &prom_phys_total [iter+1];        // bug
118     }
           ......
143 }
Figure 5.1: An example of a copy-paste related error detected by CP-Miner
This bug appears in linux-2.6.6/arch/sparc64/prom/memory.c. A similar bug is also
detected in file /arch/sparc/prom/memory.c.
copy-paste related bugs in the latest version of Linux and 23 in FreeBSD. Most of these bugs
were previously unreported.
A major reason why copy-paste introduces bugs is that programmers forget to modify
identifiers (variables, functions, types, etc.) consistently throughout the pasted code. This
mistake will be detected by a compiler if the identifier is undefined or has the wrong type.
However, these errors often slip through compile-time checks and become hidden bugs that
are very hard to detect.
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a bug detected by CP-Miner in the latest version of Linux
(2.6.6). We reported this bug to the Linux kernel community and it has been confirmed by
kernel developers [lin05]. In this example, the loop in lines 111–118 was copied from lines
92–99. In the new copy-pasted segment (lines 111–118), the variable prom phys total is
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replaced with prom prom taken in most of the cases except the one in line 117 (shown in
bold font). As a result, the pointer prom prom taken[iter].theres more incorrectly points to
the element of prom phys total instead of prom prom taken. This bug is a semantic error,
and therefore it cannot be easily detected by memory-related bug detection tools including
static checkers [CLL+02, ECC01, EA03, HCXE02, MPC+02, SD95] or dynamic tools such
as Purify [HJ92], Valgrind [SNF+], and CCured [NMW02]. Besides this bug, CP-Miner has
also detected many other similar bugs caused by copy-paste in Linux, FreeBSD, PostgreSQL
and Web Apache.
While one can imagine augmenting the software development tools and editors with
copy-paste tracking, this support does not currently exist. Therefore, we are focusing on
detecting likely copied and pasted code in an existing code base. Not all code segments
identified by previous detection tools and our tool are really the results of copy-paste (even
though we prune many of the false copy-pasted segments as described in Section 5.3.1), but
for simplicity we refer likely-copy-pasted segments as copy-pasted segments.
It is a challenging task to efficiently extract copy-pasted code in large software such as
an operating system. Even though some previous studies [Gri81, Jan88] have addressed the
related problem of plagiarism detection, they are not suitable for detecting copy-pasted code.
Those tools, such as the commonly used JPlag [PMP02], were designed to measure the degree
of similarity between a pair of programs in order to detect cheating. If these tools were to
be used to detect copy-pasted code in a single program without any modification, they would
need to compare all possible pairs of code fragments. For a program with n statements,
a total of O(n3) pairwise comparisons1 would need to be performed. This complexity is
certainly impractical for software with millions of lines of code such as Linux and FreeBSD.
Of course, it is possible to modify these tools to identify copy-pasted code in single software,
but the modification is not trivial and straightforward.
1Considering comparison between the pair of code fragments with k statements, there are (n − k + 1)





= O(n2) possible pair comparisons. Since k can be 1, 2, ..., n
2
, the
total number of pairwise comparisons is O(n3).
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5.1.1 State of the Art
So far, only a few tools have been proposed to identify copy-pasted code in a single program.
Examples of such tools include Moss [Aik05, SWA03], Dup [Bak95], CCFinder [KKI02]
and others [Bak92, BYM+98]. Most of these tools suffer from some or all of the following
limitations:
• Efficiency: Most existing tools are not scalable to large software such as operating
system code because they consume a large amount of memory and take a long time to
analyze millions of lines of code.
• Tolerance to modifications: Most tools cannot deal with modifications in copy-pasted
code. Some tools [DRD99, Joh94] can only detect copy-pasted segments that are
exactly identical. Moreover, most of the existing tools do not allow statement insertions
or modifications in a copy-pasted segment. Such modifications are very common in
standard practice. Our experiments with CP-Miner show that about one third of
copy-pasted segments contain insertion or modification of 1-2 statements.
• Bug detection: The existing tools cannot detect copy-paste related bugs. They only
aim at detecting copy-pasted code and do not consider bugs associated with copy-paste.
5.1.2 Contributions of CP-Miner
This chapter presents CP-Miner, a tool that uses data mining techniques to efficiently iden-
tify copy-pasted code in large software including operating system code, and also detects
copy-paste related bugs. It requires no modification or annotation to the source code of
software being analyzed. Our work makes three main contributions:
1. A scalable copy-paste detection tool for large software: CP-Miner can effi-
ciently find copy-pasted code in large software including operating system code. Our
experimental results show that it takes less than 20 minutes for CP-Miner to detect
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150,000–190,000 different copy-pasted segments that account for about 20–22% of the
source code in Linux and FreeBSD (each with more than 3 million lines of code). Ad-
ditionally, it takes less than one minute to detect copy-pasted segments in Apache web
server and PostgreSQL, accounting for about 17–22% of total source code.
Compared to CCFinder [KKI02], CP-Miner is able to find 17–52% more copy-pasted
segments because CP-Miner can tolerate statement insertions and modifications.
2. Detection of bugs associated with copy-paste: CP-Miner can detect copy-paste
related bugs such as the one shown in Figure 5.1, most of which are hard to detect
with existing static or dynamic bug detection tools. More specifically, CP-Miner has
detected 28 potential bugs in the latest version of Linux, 23 in FreeBSD, 5 in Web
Apache, and 2 in PostgreSQL. Most of these bugs had never been reported.
We have reported these bugs to the corresponding developers. So far five bugs have
recently been confirmed and fixed by Linux developers, and one bug has been confirmed
and fixed by Apache developers.
3. Statistical study of copy-pasted code distribution in operating system code:
Few previous studies have been conducted on the characteristics of copy-paste in large
software. Our work analyzed some interesting statistics of copy-pasted code in Linux
and FreeBSD. Our results indicate that (1) copy-pasted segments are usually not too
large, most with 5–16 statements; (2) although more than 50% of copy-pasted segments
have only two copies, a few (6.3–6.7%) copy-pasted segments are copied more than
8 times; (3) there is a significant number (11.3–13.5%) of copy-pasted segments at
function granularity (copy-paste of an entire function); (4) most (65–67%) copy-pasted
segments require renaming at least one identifier, and 23–27% of copy-pasted segments
have inserted, modified, or deleted one statement; (5) different OS modules have very
different copy-paste coverage: drivers, arch, and crypt have higher percentage of copy-
paste than other modules in Linux; (6) as the operating system code evolves, the
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amount of copy-paste also increases, but the coverage percentage of copy-pasted code
remains relatively stable over the recent versions of Linux and FreeBSD.
5.2 Background in Identifying Copy-pasted Code
Since copy-pasted code segments are usually similar to the original ones, detection of copy-
pasted code involves detecting code segments that are identical or similar.
Previous techniques for copy-paste detection can be roughly classified into three cate-
gories: (1) string-based, in which the program is divided into strings (typically lines), and
these strings are compared against each other to find sequences of duplicated strings [Bak95];
(2) parse-tree-based, in which pattern matching is performed on the parse-tree of the code
to search for similar subtrees [BYM+98, KGD95]; (3) token-based, in which the program is
divided into a stream of tokens and duplicate token sequences are identified [KKI02, PMP02].
Our tool, CP-Miner, is token-based. This approach has advantages over the other two.
First, a string-based approach does not exploit any lexical information, so it cannot deal with
simple modifications such as identifier renaming. Second, using parse trees can introduce
false positives because two segments with identical syntax trees are not necessarily copy-
pasted. This is because copy-paste is code-based rather than syntax-based, i.e., it reuses a
piece of code rather than an abstract syntax structure.
Most previous copy-paste detection tools do not sufficiently address the limitations de-
scribed in Section 5.1. Most of them consume too much time or memory to be scalable
to large software, or do not tolerate modifications made in copy-pasted code. In contrast,
CP-Miner can address both challenges.
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5.3 Design of CP-Miner
CP-Miner has two major functionalities: detecting copy-pasted code segments, and finding
copy-paste related bugs. It requires no modification to the source code of software being
analyzed. The following two subsections describe the design for each functionality.
5.3.1 Identifying Copy-pasted Code
To detect copy-pasted code, CP-Miner first converts the problem into a frequent subsequence
mining problem. It then uses an enhanced algorithm of CloSpan to find basic copy-pasted
segments. Finally, it prunes false positives and composes larger copy-pasted segments. For
convenience, we refer to a group of code segments that are similar to each other as a copy-
paste group.
CP-Miner can detect copy-pasted segments efficiently because it uses frequent subse-
quence mining techniques that can avoid many unnecessary or redundant comparisons. To
map our problem to a frequent subsequence mining problem, CP-Miner first maps a state-
ment to a number, with similar statements being mapped to the same number. Then, a
basic block (i.e., a straight-line piece of code without any jumps or jump targets in the mid-
dle) becomes a sequence of numbers. As a result, a program is mapped into a database of
many sequences. By mining the database using CloSpan, we can find frequent subsequences
that occur at least twice in the sequence database. These frequent subsequences are exactly
copy-pasted segments in the original program. By applying some pruning techniques such
as identifier mapping, we can find basic copy-pasted segments, which can then be combined
with neighboring ones to compose larger copy-pasted segments.
CP-Miner is capable of handling modifications in copy-pasted segments for two reasons.
First, similar statements are mapped into the same value. This is achieved by mapping all
identifiers (variables, functions and types) of the same type into the same value, regardless
of their actual names. This relaxation tolerates identifier renaming in copy-pasted segments.
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Even though false positives may be introduced during this process, they are addressed later
through various pruning techniques such as identifier mapping (described in Section 5.3.1).
Second, we have enhanced the basic frequent subsequence mining algorithm, CloSpan, to
support gap constraints in frequent subsequences. This enhancement allows CP-Miner to
tolerate 1–2 statement insertions, deletions, or modifications in copy-pasted code. Insertions
and deletions are symmetric because a statement deletion in one copy can also be seen as
an insertion in the other copy. Modification is a special case of insertion. Basically, the
modified statement can be treated as if both segments have a statement inserted.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the process of how CP-Miner identifies copy-pasted segments. The
main steps of the process include:
1. Parsing source code: Parse the given source code and build a sequence database (a
collection of sequences). In addition, information regarding basic blocks and block
nesting levels are also passed to the mining algorithm.
2. Mining for basic copy-pasted segments: The enhanced frequent subsequence mining
algorithm is applied to the sequence database to find basic copy-pasted segments.
3. Pruning false positives: Various techniques including identifier mapping are used to
prune false positives.
4. Composing larger copy-pasted segments: Larger copy-pasted segments are identified by
combining consecutive smaller ones. The combined copy-pasted segments are fed back
to step (3) to prune false positives. This is necessary because the combined one may
not be copy-pasted, even though each smaller one is.
Like other copy-paste detection tools, CP-Miner can only detect copy-pasted segments,
but cannot tell which segment is original and which is copy-pasted from the original. Fortu-
nately, this limitation is not a big problem because in most cases it is enough for programmers
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Figure 5.2: Flowchart of identifying copy-pasted segments
to know what segments are similar to each other. Moreover, our bug detection method de-
scribed in Section 5.3.2 does not rely on such differentiation. Additionally, if programmers
really need the differentiation, navigating through RCS versions could help figuring out which
segment is the original copy.
Parsing Source Code
The main purpose of parsing source code is to build a sequence database (a collection of
sequences) in order to convert the copy-paste detection problem to a frequent subsequence
mining problem. Comments are not considered normal statements in CP-Miner, and are
thereby filtered by our parser. The current prototype of the CP-Miner parser only works for
programs written in C or C++, but it is easy to modify it for other programming languages.
A statement is mapped to a number by first tokenizing its components such as variables,
operators, constants, functions, keywords, etc. To tolerate identifier renaming in copy-
pasted segments, identifiers of the same type are mapped into the same token. Constants
are handled in the same way as identifiers: constants of the same type are mapped into the
same token. However, operators and keywords are handled differently, with each one mapped
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to a unique token. After all the components of a statement are tokenized, a hash value digest
is computed using the “hashpjw” [ASU86] hash function, chosen for its low collision rate.
Figure 5.3 shows the hash value for each statement in the example shown in Figure 5.1 of
Section 5.1. As shown in this figure, the statement in lines 93–94 and the statement in lines
112–113 have the same hash values.
After each statement is mapped, the program becomes a long number sequence. Un-
fortunately, the frequent subsequence mining algorithms need a collection of sequences (a
sequence database) as described in Section 2.2, so we need a way to cut this long sequence
into many short ones. One simple method is to use a fixed cutting window size (e.g., ev-
ery 20 statements) to break the long sequence into many short ones. This method has two
disadvantages. First, some frequent subsequences across two or more windows may be lost.
Second, it is not easy to decide the window size: if it is too long, the mining algorithm
would be very slow; if too short, too much information may be lost on the boundary of two
consecutive windows.
Instead, CP-Miner uses a more elegant method to perform the cutting. It takes advantage
of some simple syntax information and uses a basic programming block as the unit to break
the long sequence into short ones. The idea for this cutting method is that a copy-pasted
segment is usually either a part of a basic block or consists of multiple basic blocks. In
addition, basic blocks are usually not too long to cause performance problems in CloSpan.
By using a basic block as the cutting unit, CP-Miner can first find basic copy-pasted segments
and then compose larger ones from smaller ones. Since different basic blocks have a different
number of statements, their corresponding sequences also have different length. But this is
not a problem for CloSpan because it can deal with sequences of different sizes. The example







 68 void __init prom_meminit(void)
 69 {
     . . . . . .
 92  for(iter=0; iter<num_regs; iter++) {
 93    prom_phys_total[iter].start_adr =
 94      prom_reg_memlist[iter].phys_addr;
 95    prom_phys_total[iter].num_bytes =
 96      prom_reg_memlist[iter].reg_size;
 97    prom_phys_total[iter].theres_more =
 98       &prom_phys_total[iter+1];
 99  }
     . . . . . .
111  for(iter=0; iter<num_regs; iter++) {
112    prom_prom_taken[iter].start_adr =
113      prom_reg_memlist[iter].phys_addr;
114    prom_prom_taken[iter].num_bytes =
115      prom_reg_memlist[iter].reg_size;
116    prom_prom_taken[iter].theres_more =
117       &prom_phys_total [iter+1];
118  }
     . . . . . .
143 }
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Besides a collection of sequences, the parser also passes to the mining algorithm the
source code information of each sequence. Such information includes (1) the nesting level of
each basic block, which is later used to guide the composition of larger copy-pasted segments
from smaller ones; (2) the file name and line number, which is used to locate the copy-pasted
code corresponding to a frequent subsequence identified by the mining algorithm.
Mining for Basic Copy-pasted Segments
After CP-Miner parses the source code of a given program, it generates a sequence database
with each sequence representing a basic block. At the next step, it applies the frequent
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subsequence mining algorithm, CloSpan, on this database to find frequent subsequences
with support value of at least 2, which corresponds to code segments that have appeared
in the program at least twice. In the example shown in Figure 5.3, CP-Miner would find
(133872016, 133872016, 82589171) as a frequent subsequence because it occurs twice in the
sequence database. Therefore, the corresponding code segments in line 111–118 and line
92–99 are basic copy-pasted segments.
Unfortunately, the mining process is not as straightforward as expected. The main reason
is that the original CloSpan algorithm was not designed exactly for our purpose, and nor were
other frequent subsequence mining algorithms. Most existing algorithms including CloSpan
have the following two limitations that we had to enhance CloSpan to make it applicable for
copy-paste detection:
(1) Adding gap constraints in frequent subsequences: In most existing frequent
subsequence mining algorithms, frequent subsequences are not necessarily contiguous in their
supporting sequences. For example, sequence abdec provides 1 support for subsequence abc,
even though abc does not appear contiguously in abdec. It is possible to have a large gap
in the occurrence of a frequent subsequence in one of its supporting sequences. Hence,
its corresponding code segment would have several statements inserted. Such segment is
unlikely to be copy-pasted.
To address this problem, we modified CloSpan to add a gap constraint in frequent sub-
sequences. CP-Miner only mines for frequent subsequences with a maximum gap not larger
than a given threshold called max gap. If the maximum gap of a subsequence in a sequence
is larger than max gap, this sequence is not “supporting” this subsequence. For example,
for the sequence database D = {abced, abecf, agbch, abijc, aklc}, the support of subsequence
abc is 1 if max gap equals 0, and the support is 3 if max gap equals 1.
The gap constraint with max gap = 0 means that no statement insertion or deletions are
allowed in copy-paste, whereas the gap constraint with max gap = 1 or max gap = 2 means
that 1 or 2 statement insertions/deletions are tolerated in copy-paste.
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(2) Matching frequent subsequences to copy-pasted segments: The original CloSpan
algorithm outputs only frequent subsequences and their corresponding support values, but
not their corresponding supporting sequences. To find copy-pasted code, we need to find the
supporting sequences for each frequent subsequence.
We enhance CloSpan to address this problem. When CP-Miner generates a frequent
subsequence, it maintains a list of IDs of its supporting sequences. In the above exam-
ple, CP-Miner outputs two frequent subsequences: (67641265) and (133872016, 133872016,
82589171), each with their supporting sequence IDs, based on which the locations of the
corresponding basic copy-pasted segments (file name and line numbers) can be identified.
Composing Larger Copy-pasted Segments
Since every sequence fed to the mining algorithm represents a basic block, a basic copy-pasted
segment may only be a part of a larger copy-pasted segment. Therefore, it is necessary to
combine a basic copy-pasted segment with its neighbors to construct a larger one, if possible.
The composition procedure is very straightforward. CP-Miner maintains a candidate
set of copy-paste groups, which initially includes all of the basic copy-pasted segments that
survive the pruning procedure described in Section 5.3.1. For each copy-paste group, CP-
Miner checks their neighboring code segments to see if they also form a copy-paste group. If
so, the two groups are combined together to form a larger one. This larger copy-paste group
is checked against the pruning procedure. If it can survive the pruning process, it is added
to the candidate set and the two smaller ones are removed. Otherwise, the two smaller ones
still remain in the set and are marked as “non-expandable”. CP-Miner repeats this process
until all groups in the candidate set are non-expandable.
Pruning False Positives
It is possible that copy-pasted segments discovered by the mining algorithm or the composi-
tion process may contain false positives. The main cause of false positives is the tokenization
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of identifiers (variable/function/type) in order to tolerate identifier-renaming in copy-paste.
Since identifiers of the same type are mapped into the same token, it is possible to identify
false copy-pasted segments. For example, all statements similar to x = y + z would have the
same hash value, which can introduce many false positives. To prune false positives, CP-
Miner has applied several techniques to both of basic and composed copy-pasted segments.
The pruning techniques include:
(1) Pruning unmappable segments: This technique is used to prune false positives
introduced by the tokenization of identifiers. This is based on the observation that if a
programmer copy-pastes a code segment and then renames an identifier, he/she would most
likely rename this identifier in all its occurrences in the new copy-pasted segment. Therefore,
we can build an identifier mapping that maps old names in one segment to their corresponding
new ones in the other segment that belongs to the same copy-paste group. In the example
shown in Figure 5.3, variable prom phys total is changed into prom prom taken (except the
bug on line 117).
A mapping scheme is consistent if there are very few conflicts that map one identifier name
to two or more different new names. If no consistent identifier mapping can be established
between a pair of copy-pasted segments, they are likely to be false positives.
To measure the amount of conflict, CP-Miner uses a metric called ConflictRatio, which
records the conflict ratio for an identifier mapping between two candidate copy-pasted seg-
ments. For example, if a variable A from segment 1 is changed into a in 75% of its occurrences
in segment 2 but 25% of its occurrences is changed into other variables, the ConflictRatio of
mapping A→ a is 25%. The ConflictRatio for the whole mapping scheme between these two
segments are the weighted sum of ConflictRatio of the mapping for each unique identifier.
The weight for an identifier A in a given code segment is the fraction of total identifier occur-
rences that are occurrences of A. If ConflictRatio for two candidate copy-pasted segments
is higher than a predefined threshold, these two code segments are filtered as false positives.
In our experiments, we set the threshold to be 60%.
86
(2) Pruning tiny segments: Our mining algorithm may find tiny copy-pasted segments
that consist of only 1-2 simple statements. If such a tiny segment cannot be combined
with neighbors to compose a larger segment, it is removed from the copy-paste list. This
is based on the observation that copy-pasted segments are usually not very small because
programmers cannot save much effort in copy-pasting a simple tiny code segment.
CP-Miner uses the number of tokens to measure the size of a segment. This metric is
more appropriate than the number of statements, because the length of statements is highly
variable. If a single statement is very complicated with many tokens, it is still possible for
programmers to copy-paste it.
To prune tiny segments, CP-Miner uses a tunable parameter called min size. If the
number of tokens in a pair of copy-pasted segments is fewer than min size, this pair is
removed.
(3) Pruning overlapped segments: If a pair of candidate copy-pasted segments overlap
with each other, they are also considered false positives. CP-Miner stops extending the pair
of copy-pasted segments once they overlap. For some program structures such as the switch
statement that contain many pairs of self-similar segments, pruning overlapped segments
can avoid most of the false positives in switch statements.
(4) Pruning segments with large gaps: Besides the mining procedure for basic copy-
pasted segments, the gap constraint is also applied to composed ones. When two neighboring
segments are combined, the maximum gap of the newly composed large segment may become
larger than a predefined threshold, max total gap. If this is true, the composition is invalid.
So the newly composed one is not added into the candidate set and the two smaller ones are
marked as non-expandable in the set.
Of course, even after such rigorous pruning, false positives may still exist. However,
we have manually examined 100 random copy-pasted segments reported by CP-Miner for
Linux, and only a few false positives (8) are found. We can only manually examine each
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identified copy-pasted segment because there are no traces that record programmers’ copy-
paste operations during the development of the software.
Computational Complexity of CP-Miner
CP-Miner can extract copy-pasted code directly from a single software with total complexity
of O(n2) in the worst case (where n is the number of lines of code), and the optimizations
further improve its efficiency in practice. For example, CP-Miner can identify more than
150,000 copy-pasted segments from 3–4 million lines of code in less than 20 minutes as shown
in our results in Section 5.5.3. In CP-Miner, we break all of the large basic blocks into
small blocks with at most 30 statements before feeding to the mining algorithm. Therefore,
the search tree is at most with depth 30. With this constraint of search tree, the mining
complexity of CP-Miner is O(n2) in the worst case. Furthermore, the optimizations described
in Section 2.2 make it more efficient in both time and space overheads than the worst case.
5.3.2 Detecting Copy-paste Related Bugs
As we have mentioned in Section 5.1, the main cause of copy-paste related bugs is that
programmers forget to modify identifiers consistently after copy-pasting. Once we get the
mapping relationship between identifiers in a pair of copy-pasted segments (see Section 5.3.1),
we can find the inconsistency and report these copy-paste related bugs. Table 5.1 shows the
identifier mapping for the example described in Section 5.1.
Identifiers in segment I Identifiers in segment II
(line 92-99) (line 111-118)
iter (9) iter (9)
num reg (1) num reg (1)
prom phys total (4) prom prom taken (3);
prom phys total (1)
prom reg memlist (2) prom reg memlist (2)
Table 5.1: Identifier mapping in the example in Figure 5.1
The number after each identifier indicates the number of occurrences).
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For an identifier that appears more than once in a copy-pasted segment, it is consis-
tent when it always maps to the same identifier in the other segment. Similarly, it is
inconsistent when it maps itself to multiple identifiers. In Table 5.1, we can see that
prom phys total is mapped inconsistently, because it maps to prom prom taken three times
and prom phys total once. All the other variable mappings are consistent.
Unfortunately, inconsistency does not necessarily indicate a bug. If the amount of incon-
sistency is high, it may indicate that the code segments are not copy-pasted. Section 5.3.1
describes how we prune unmappable copy-pasted segments based on this observation.
Therefore, the challenge is to decide when an inconsistency is likely to be a bug instead of a
false positive of copy-paste. To address this challenge, we need to consider the programmers’
intention. Our bug detection method is based on the following observation: if a programmer
makes a change in a copy-pasted segment, the changed identifier is unlikely to be a bug. But
if he/she changes an identifier in most places but forgets to change it in a few places, the
unchanged identifier is likely to be a bug. In other words, “forget-to-change” is more likely
to be a bug than an intentional “change”. For example, if in some cases, an identifier A is
mapped into a and in other cases it is mapped into a′ (both a and a′ are different from A),
it is unlikely to be a bug because programmers intentionally change A to other names. On
the other hand, if A is changed into a in most cases but remains unchanged only in a few
cases, the unchanged places are likely to be bugs.
Based on the above observation, CP-Miner reexamines each non-expandable copy-paste
group after running through the pruning and composing procedures. For each pair of copy-





where NumUnchanged means the number of occurrences that a given identifier is unchanged,
and NumTotal means the number of total occurrences of this identifier in a given copy-
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pasted segment. Therefore, the lower the UnchangedRatio, the more likely it is a bug, unless
UnchangedRatio = 0, which means that all of its occurrences have been changed. Note
that UnchangedRatio is different from ConflictRatio. The former only measures the ratio of
unchanged occurrences, whereas the latter measures the ratio of conflicts. In the example
shown on Table 5.1, UnchangedRatio for prom phys total is 0.25, whereas all other identifiers
have UnchangedRatio = 1.
CP-Miner uses a threshold for UnchangedRatio to detect bugs. If UnchangedRatio for an
identifier is not zero and not larger than the threshold, the unchanged places are reported
as bugs. When CP-Miner reports a bug, the corresponding identifier mapping information
is also provided to programmers to help in debugging. In the example shown on Table 5.1,
identifier prom phys total on line 117 is reported as a bug.
It is possible to further extend CP-Miner’s bug detection engine. For example, it might
be useful to exploit variable correlations. Assume variable A always appears in close range
to another variable B, and a always appears very close to b. So if in a pair of copy-pasted
segments, A is renamed to a, B then should be renamed to b with high confidence. Any
violation of this rule may indicate a bug. But the current version of CP-Miner has not
exploited this possibility.
5.4 Methodology
We have evaluated the effectiveness of CP-Miner with large software including Linux, FreeBSD,
Apache web server and PostgreSQL. The number of files (only C files) and the number of
lines of code (LOC) for the software are shown in Table 5.2.
Software version #files #LOC
Linux 2.6.6 6,497 4,365,124
FreeBSD 5.2.1 7,114 3,299,622
Apache 2.0.49 479 223,886
PostgreSQL 7.4.2 553 458,058
Table 5.2: Software evaluated in our experiments.
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We set the thresholds used in CP-Miner as following. The minimum copy-pasted segment
size min size is 30 tokens. We also vary the gap constraints: (1) when max gap = 0, CP-
Miner only identifies copy-pasted code with identifier-renaming; (2) when max gap = 1 and
max total gap = 2, it means that CP-Miner allows copy-pasted segments with insertion
and deletion of one statement between any two consecutive statements, and a total of two
statement insertions and deletions in the whole segment. Without specifying, we use setting
(2) by default.
We define CP Coverage to measure the percentage of copy-paste in given software (or a
given module):
CP Coverage =
#LOC in copy-pasted segments
#LOC in the software or the module
× 100%
In our experiments, we also compare CP-Miner with a recently proposed tool called
CCFinder [KKI02]. Similar to our tool, CCFinder also tokenizes identifiers, keywords, con-
stant, operators, etc. But different from our tool, it uses a suffix tree algorithm instead of
a data mining algorithm. Therefore, it cannot tolerate statement insertions and deletions
in copy-pasted code. Our results show that CP-Miner detects 17–52% more copy-pasted
code than CCFinder. In addition, CCFinder does not filter incomplete, tiny copy-pasted
segments which are very likely to be false positives. CCFinder does not detect copy-paste
related bugs, so we cannot compare this functionality between them.
In our experiments, we run CP-Miner and CCFinder on an Intel Xeon 2.4GHz machine
with 2GB memory.
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5.5 CP-Miner Basic Results
We first present the basic results of CP-Miner in this section, including the number of copy-
pasted segments, the number of detected copy-pasted bugs, CP-Miner overhead, comparison
with CCFinder, and effects of threshold setting. The statistical results of copy-paste char-
acteristics in Linux and FreeBSD will be presented in Section 5.6.
5.5.1 Overall Results
Detecting Copy-pasted Code CP-Miner has found a significant number of copy-pasted
segments in the evaluated software. The total amount of copy-paste covers 17.7–22.3% of
the source code in these software. Table 5.3 shows the numbers of copy-pasted segments
and CP Coverages for these software. As shown on this table, in Linux and FreeBSD,
there are more than 100,000 and 120,000 copy-pasted segments without any statement in-
sertion (max gap = 0), which account for about 15% of the source code. We have manually
examined the identified copy-pasted segments in one of the Linux modules (file system),
and found very few (only 3) false positives out of 90 identified copy-pasted segments (with
max gap = 1). The large number of copy-pasted segments motivates a support in software
development environments such as Microsoft Visual Studio to maintain copy-pasted code.
Software max gap = 0 max gap = 1
#Segments Coverage #Segments Coverage
Linux 122,282 15.3% 198,605 22.3%
FreeBSD 101,699 14.9% 153,230 20.4%
Apache 4,155 13.1% 6,196 17.7%
PostgreSQL 12,105 16.5% 16,662 22.2%
Table 5.3: The number of copy-pasted segments and CP Coverage
Our results also show that a large percentage (30–50%) of copy-pasted segments have
statement insertions and modifications. For example, when max gap is 1, CP-Miner finds
62.4% more copy-pasted segments in Linux. In FreeBSD, the CP Coverage increases from
14.9% to 20.4% when max gap is relaxed from 0 to 1. These results show that previous tools
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including CCFinder that cannot tolerate statement insertions and modifications would miss
a lot of copy-paste.
By increasing max gap from 1 to 2 or higher, we can further relax the gap constraint. Also
the number of false positives will increase with max gap. Our manual examination results
with the Linux file system module indicate that false positives are low with max gap = 1,
and relatively low with max gap = 2.
Detecting Copy-paste Related Bugs CP-Miner has also reported many copy-paste
related errors in the evaluated software. Since the errors reported by CP-Miner may not be
bugs, we verify each reported error manually and then report to the corresponding developer
community those errors that we suspect to be bugs with high confidence. The numbers of
errors found by CP-Miner and verified bugs are shown on Table 5.4. The results are achieved
by setting the UnchangeRatioThreshold to be 0.4.
Both Linux and FreeBSD have many copy-paste related bugs. So far, we have verified
28 and 23 bugs in the latest versions of Linux and FreeBSD. Most of these bugs had never
been reported before. We have reported these bugs to the kernel developer communities.
Recently, five Linux bugs have been confirmed and fixed by kernel developers, and the others
are still in the process of being confirmed.
Since Apache and PostgreSQL are much smaller compared to Linux and FreeBSD, CP-
Miner found much fewer copy-paste related bugs. We have verified 6 bugs for Apache and 2
bugs for PostgreSQL with high confidence. One bug in Apache was immediately fixed by the
Apache developers after we reported it to them.
In addition to those bugs verified, we also find many “potential bugs” (21 in Linux) that
are not bugs by coincidence but might become bugs in the future. We call these types of
errors as “careless programming”. Similar to the bugs verified, these errors also forget to
change some identifiers consistently at a few places. Fortunately, by coincidence, the new
identifiers and the old identifiers happen to have the same values. However, if such implicit
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Software errors bugs careless false alarms
reported verified programming incorrectly exchangeable others
matched segments orders
Linux 421 28 21 151 41 57
FreeBSD 443 23 8 307 41 30
Apache 17 5 0 3 1 6
PostgreSQL 74 2 0 13 10 43
Table 5.4: Errors reported by CP-Miner
The table shows the bugs verified by us with high confidence, some of which are confirmed and
fixed by corresponding developers after we reported. The false alarms in the first two categories
can be pruned. (UnchangeRatioThreshold = 0.4.)
assumptions are violated in future versions of the software, it would lead to bugs that are
hard to detect.
5.5.2 False Alarms
Table 5.4 also shows the number of false alarms reported by CP-Miner. These false alarms
are mostly caused by the following two major reasons and can be further pruned::
(1) Incorrectly matched copy-pasted segments: In some copy-pasted segments that
contain multiple “case/if ” blocks, there are many possible combinations for these contiguous
copy-pasted blocks to compose larger ones. Since CP-Miner simply follows the program order
to compose larger copy-pastes, it is likely that a wrong combination might be chosen. As
a result, identifiers are compared between two incorrectly matched copy-pasted segments,
which results in false alarms.
These false alarms can be pruned if we use more semantic information of the identifiers
in these segments. The segments with a number of “case/if ” blocks usually contain a lot
of constant identifiers, but our current CP-Miner treats them as normal variable names. If
we use the information of these constants to match “case/if ” blocks when composing larger
copy-pasted segments, it can reduce the number of incorrectly matched segments and most
of such false alarms can be pruned.
(2) Exchangeable orders: In a copy-paste pair, the orders of some statements or ex-
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pressions can be switched. For example, a segment with several similar statements such as
“a1=b1; a2=b2;” is the same as “a2=b2; a1=b1;”. The current version of CP-Miner simply
compares the identifiers in a pair of copy-pasted segments in strict order and therefore a
false alarm might be reported. In Linux, 41 false alarms are caused by such exchangeable
orders.
These false alarms can be pruned if we relax the strict order comparison by further
checking whether the corresponding “changed” identifiers are in the neighboring state-
ments/expressions.
5.5.3 Time and Space Overheads
CP-Miner can identify copy-pasted code in large software very efficiently. The execution
time of CP-Miner is shown in Table 5.5. CP-Miner takes 11–20 minutes to identify 101,699–
198,605 copy-pasted segments in Linux and FreeBSD, each with 3–4 millions of lines of code.
It takes less than 1 minute to detect copy-pasted segments in Apache and PostgreSQL with
more than 200,000 lines of code.
CP-Miner is also space-efficient. For example, it takes less than 530MB to find copy-
pasted code in Linux. For Apache and PostgreSQL, CP-Miner only consumes 27–57 MB of
memory.
Software max gap = 0 max gap = 1
Time(s) Space(MB) Time(s) Space(MB)
Linux 770 438 1164 527
FreeBSD 615 334 1155 459
Apache 14 27 15 30
PostgreSQL 32 44 38 57
Table 5.5: Execution time and memory space of CP-Miner
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5.5.4 Comparison with CCFinder
We have compared CP-Miner with CCFinder [KKI02]. CCFinder has similar execution
time as CP-Miner, but CP-Miner discovers many more copy-pasted segments. In addition,
CCFinder cannot detect copy-paste related bugs. As we explained in Section 5.4, CCFinder
allows identifier-renaming but not statement insertions. In addition, CCFinder does not
have rigorous pruning operations as CP-Miner. For example, CCFinder reports many tiny
copy-pasted segments fewer than 30 tokens, which are too simple to be worthy to copy-paste.
In addition, it also includes incomplete statement in copy-pasted segments, which is very
unlike to be the case in practice.
CP-Miner can identify 17–52% more copy-pasted code than CCFinder because CP-Miner
can tolerate statement insertions and modifications. Table 5.6 compares the CP Coverages
identified by CP-Miner and CCFinder. The results with CP-Miner are achieved using the
default threshold setting (min size = 30 and max gap = 1). For fair comparison, we also
filter those tiny, incomplete segments from CCFinder’s output. The results show that around






Table 5.6: CP Coverage comparison between CP-Miner and CCFinder
For CCFinder, the first number is the result after pruning those tiny, incomplete segments, and
the second number in () is the result before pruning.
5.5.5 Effects of Threshold Settings
Segment Size Threshold Figure 5.4 shows the effect of segment-size threshold min size on
CP Coverage. As expected, the CP Coverage decreases when min size increases because
more copy-pasted segments are pruned. The results also show the decrement slowdowns
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when min size is in the range of 30–100 (tokens), which indicates that not too many copy-
segments’ sizes fall in this range. This implies that segments with fewer than 30 tokens are























Figure 5.4: Effects of min size on CP Coverage
Unchange Ratio Threshold Figure 5.5 shows the effect of threshold UnchangeRatioThreshold
on the number of bugs reported. Since UnchangeRatio ≥ 0.5 means that at least half of the
identifiers are not changed after copy-paste, these unchanged identifiers are unlikely “forget-
to-change” and so it cannot indicate a copy-paste related error. Therefore, we only show the
errors with UnchangeRatioThreshold < 0.5.

























Figure 5.5: Effects of UnchangeRatioThreshold on errors reported
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increases. Specifically, the number of errors reported increases gradually when the threshold
is less than 0.25, and then increases sharply when the threshold ∈ (0.25, 0.35). We found that
most of the errors with high UnchangeRatio turn out to be false bugs during our verification.
For example, CP-Miner reports many errors where only 1 out of 3 identifiers is unchanged
(UnchangeRatio = 0.33). However, it cannot strongly support that it is a copy-paste related
bug. In order to prune such false bugs, we can further analyze the identifiers in the context
of the copy-pasted segments (e.g., the whole function).
5.5.6 Another Bug Example
In introduction, we have shown a copy-paste related bug in Figure 5.1. In order to further
demonstrate what kind of bugs can be detected by CP-Miner, we show another typical
copy-paste related bug in Figure 5.6. In this example, the two segments in lines 246–257
and lines 258–269 are copy-paste group, each of which initializes the IOP (I/O processor)
differentiated by constants IOP NUM SCC (=0) and IOP NUM ISM (=1), respectively.
However, the identifier IOP NUM SCC in line 264 is not correctly changed to IOP NUM -
ISM correspondingly, and it results in a wrong initial status of IOPs.
This bug would overwrite the old value (0x87) of iop base[IOP NUM SCC]–>status ctrl
by 0. This cannot be detected by previous bug detection tools because it is not a simple
buffer overflow bug (since IOP NUM SCC equals to 0), incorrect pointer manipulation, or
free memory access. This bug, if known by malicious users who plan a security attack, may
cause the server crash.
5.6 Statistics of Copy-paste in OS code
This section presents the statistical results on copy-paste characteristics in large software.
Our results include the distribution of copy-pasted segments across different group sizes,
segment sizes, granularity, amount of changes, modules, and versions.
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 ( linux-2.6.6/arch/m68k/mac/iop.c )
244 void __init iop_preinit(void)
245 {
246   if (macintosh_config->scc_type == MAC_SCC_IOP) {
247     if (macintosh_config->ident == MAC_MODEL_IIFX) {
248       iop_base[IOP_NUM_SCC] = (struct mac_iop *) SCC_IOP_BASE_IIFX;
249     } else {
250       iop_base[IOP_NUM_SCC] = (struct mac_iop *)SCC_IOP_BASE_QUADRA;
251     }
252     iop_base[IOP_NUM_SCC]->status_ctrl = 0x87;
. . . . . .
257   }
258   if (macintosh_config->adb_type == MAC_ADB_IOP) {
259     if (macintosh_config->ident == MAC_MODEL_IIFX) {
260       iop_base[IOP_NUM_ISM] = (struct mac_iop *) ISM_IOP_BASE_IIFX;
261     } else {
262       iop_base[IOP_NUM_ISM] = (struct mac_iop *)ISM_IOP_BASE_QUADRA;
263     }
264     iop_base[ IOP_NUM_SCC]->status_ctrl = 0;               // bug
. . . . . .
269   }
Figure 5.6: Another example of copy-paste-related error detected by CP-Miner
This bug appears in linux-2.6.6/arch/m68k/mac/iop.c.
5.6.1 Copy-pasted Segment Size and Granularity
Figure 5.7 illustrates the distribution of copy-pasted segments with different sizes (in terms of
the number of statements). The results show that most (60–64%) copy-pasted segments are
not very large, with only 5–16 statements. Only a few (0.2–5.0%) copy-pasted segments have
more than 64 statements. In particular, Figure 5.7(a) shows that most (35–40%) copy-paste
groups contain 5–8 statements in each segment. Figure 5.7 (b) shows similar characteristics:
copy-pasted segments with 5–8 statements cover about 7–10% of the source code.
Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of copy-paste group size. About 60% of copy-paste
groups contain only two segments, which indicates that there are only two copies (original
and replicated) for most copy-pasted code. But still, 40% of the copy-pasted code groups
contain at least 3 segments, which indicates that a lot of code is replicated more than once.
Total 4.0–6.7% of copy-pasted segments are copy-pasted more than 7 times. If a bug














































































































































































































































































































(b) The CP Coverage with various segment sizes (number of statements)
Figure 5.7: Size distribution of copy-pasted segments
Due to the overlap of copy-pasted segments that have different segment sizes and also
belong to different copy-paste groups, the sum of all CP Coverage does not equal to the
overall CP Coverage.
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bug in the other 7 or more copies. This motivates a tool that can automatically fix other





















































































Figure 5.8: Copy-paste group size distribution
Group size is the number of segments in each copy-paste group. Each bar represents the
percentage of copy-paste groups that contains the corresponding number of segments.
Table 5.7 shows the number of copy-pasted segments at basic-block and function gran-
ularity Our results show that only 3–11.8% of all copy-pasted segments are basic blocks,
which indicates that programmers seldom copy-paste basic blocks because most of them are
too simple to be worthy copy-pasting.
More interestingly, there are many (11.3–19.2%) copy-pasted segments at function gran-
ularity. The reason is that many functions provide similar functionality, such as reading
data from different types of I/O devices. Those functions can be copy-pasted with some
modifications such as replacing parameters’ data types. This motivates some refactoring
tools [JO93] to better maintain these copy-pasted functions.
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Software basic block function
Linux 17,818 (9.0%) 26,744 (13.5%)
FreeBSD 13,999 (9.1%) 17,254 (11.3%)
Apache 733 (11.8%) 1,189 (19.2%)
PostgreSQL 494 (3.0%) 2,280 (13.7%)
Table 5.7: Distribution of copy-paste granularity
Numbers and percentages of copy-pasted segments at different granularity. Note here the
percentage is not CP Coverage. It is calculated by comparing to the total number of copy-pasted
segments.
5.6.2 Modifications in Copy-pasted Segments
Figure 5.9 shows how many identifiers are changed in copy-pasted segments. Since in some
cases there are more than two segments in each copy-paste group, we only present the
distribution in the best case: comparing the most similar pair of segments from each copy-
paste group. Each bar includes two parts: one with no statement insertion and the other
with one statement insertion.
The results indicate that 59–76% of copy-pasted segments require identifier-renaming.
For example, in Linux, 27% copy-pasted segments are identical, and 8% segments are almost
identical with only one statement inserted. The rest 65% of the copy-pasted segments in
Linux rename at least one identifier. Such results motivate a tool to support consistently
renaming identifiers in copy-pasted code.
5.6.3 Copy-pasted Code across Modules
Different modules in a software have different characteristics of copy-paste. In this subsec-
tion, we analyze the copy-pasted code across different modules in operating system code.
We split Linux into 9 categories: arch (platform specific), fs (file system), kernel (main ker-
nel), mm (memory management), net (networking), sound (sound device drivers), drivers
(device drivers other than networking and sound device), crypto (cryptography), and others
(all other code). For FreeBSD, modules are also split into 9 categories: sys (kernel sources),
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Figure 5.9: Distribution of identifiers changed in copy-pasted segments
Each bar represents the percentage of segments that have the corresponding number of renamed identifiers.
Each bar has two parts: “Gap = 0” and “Gap = 1” represent the copy-pasted segments with no and one
statement modifications, respectively.
usr.bin (user commands), sbin (system commands), bin (system/user commands), gnu, and
others.
Distribution of copy-pasted code in modules Figure 5.10 shows the number and
CP Coverage of copy-pasted segments in different modules of Linux and FreeBSD. The
CP Coverages are computed based on the size of each corresponding module, instead of the
entire software.
Figure 5.10 (a) shows that most copy-pasted code in Linux and FreeBSD is located in
one or two main modules. For example, modules “drivers” and “arch” account for 71% of all
copy-pasted code in Linux, and module “sys” accounts for 60% in FreeBSD. This is because
many drivers are similar, and it is much easier to modify a copy-paste of another driver than
writing one from scratch.
Figure 5.10 (b) shows that a large percentage (20–28%) of the code in Linux is copy-
































































































































































(b) CP Coverage in different modules
Figure 5.10: Copy-pasted code in different modules
cluding “net”, “sound”, and “drivers”. The “arch” module has a lot of copy-pasted code
because it has many similar sub-modules for different platforms. The device driver modules
contain a significant portion of copy-pasted code because many devices share similar func-
tionalities. Additionally, “crypto” is a very small module (less than 10,000 LOC), but the
main cryptography algorithms consist of a number of similar computing steps, so it contains
a lot of copy-pasted code. Our results indicate that more attention should be paid to these
modules because they are more likely to contain copy-paste related bugs.
In contrast, the modules “mm” and “kernel” contain much less copy-pasted code than
others, which indicates that it is rare to reuse code in kernels and memory management
modules.
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Module (LOC) arch fs kernel mm net sound drivers crypto others
arch (724858) 25.1 1.4 0.5 0.3 1.1 1.3 3.2 0.1 0.8
fs (475946) 1.4 16.5 0.6 0.5 1.7 1.2 2.2 0.0 0.7
kernel (30629) 3.0 1.8 7.9 0.6 2.3 1.6 2.8 0.1 0.8
mm (23490) 2.6 2.2 0.8 6.2 1.7 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.7
net (334325) 1.8 2.5 1.1 0.7 20.7 2.1 3.7 0.1 1.0
sound (373109) 2.3 2.0 1.0 0.6 2.2 27.4 4.6 0.2 1.1
drivers (2344594) 2.3 1.7 0.6 0.4 1.8 2.0 21.4 0.1 0.6
crypto (9157) 2.3 2.2 0.3 0.1 1.1 1.5 2.5 26.1 2.2
others (49016) 3.8 1.9 0.8 0.4 1.7 1.5 2.6 0.3 15.2
(a) Linux 2.6.6
Module (LOC) sys lib crypto usr.sbin usr.bin sbin bin gnu others
sys (1767368) 22.5 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.8
lib (291132) 3.3 18.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.9
crypto (392020) 2.1 1.6 16.7 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.9
usr.sbin (310949) 3.5 2.5 2.2 17.7 3.8 2.8 1.0 1.6 2.5
usr.bin (236952) 2.6 1.8 1.7 3.4 11.9 2.2 1.2 1.1 1.9
sbin (112284) 3.1 2.0 1.7 3.5 3.1 16.9 1.2 1.1 2.2
bin (47008) 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 1.8 10.9 0.8 1.6
gnu (64996) 2.8 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.6 0.9 0.7 14.5 1.1
others (76913) 2.9 2.4 2.0 3.3 3.1 2.6 1.0 1.2 12.7
(b) FreeBSD 5.2.1
Table 5.8: Copy-paste code within a module and across modules
Each number in the table represents the CP Coverage of code copy-pasted from another module.
For example, in (a), the number at row “arch” and column “arch” represents that 25.1% of code
in module “arch” is copy-pasted within the module itself; the number at row “arch” and column
“drivers” represents that 3.2% of the code in module “arch” is copy-pasted from/to another
module “drivers”.
Copy-pasted code within/across modules The code in a module can be copy-pasted
within the module itself or from other modules. Table 5.8 shows how much code is copy-
pasted within the module itself or across different modules.
Most of copy-pasted code is within the same module as indicated by the bold numbers
in Table 5.8. The CP Coverage of copy-pasted code within a module is usually more than
15%, and some are even more than 20%. On the other hand, the CP Coverage of the code
that is copy-pasted across different modules is much lower than those within a module, which
is usually lower than 4%.













































































































































































































































































(d) “sys” in FreeBSD
Figure 5.11: Copy-pasted code in Linux and FreeBSD through various versions
x-axis (version number) is drawn in time scale with the corresponding release time. The
versions of Linux we analyze are through 1.0 to the current version 2.6.6. The versions of
FreeBSD include the main branch through 2.0 to 4.10.
from “drivers”. The reason is that “sound” was originally one of the sub-modules in module
“drivers” before it was separated since version 2.5.5. Therefore, “sound” still shares a lot of
code with “drivers”.
5.6.4 Copy-paste Evolution
Figure 5.11 shows that the amount of copy-pasted code increases as the operating system
code evolves. For example, Figure 5.11(a) shows the amount of copy-pasted code in Linux
through version 1.0 to 2.6.6 over time. As Linux’s code size increases from 141,000 to 4.4
million lines, copy-pasted code also keeps increasing from 23,000 to 975,000 lines.
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In terms of CP Coverage, the percentage of copy-pasted code also steadily increases
along software evolution. For example, Figure 5.11(a) shows that CP Coverage in Linux
increases from 16.2% to 22.3% in Linux from version 1.0 to 2.6.6, and Figure 5.11(c) shows
that CP Coverage in FreeBSD increases from 17.5% to 21.7% from version 2.0 to 4.10.
However, the CP Coverage remains relatively stable over the recent several versions for
both Linux and FreeBSD. For example, the CP Coverage for FreeBSD has been staying at
around 21–22% since version 4.0.
Most of the growth of copy-paste coverage comes from a few modules including “drivers”
and “arch” in Linux and “sys” in FreeBSD. Figure 5.11(b) shows copy-pasted code in the
module “drivers” individually through multiple versions. The percentage of copy-pasted
code increases more rapidly in this module than in the entire software. For example, in
version 1.0, the CP Coverage is only 11.9% in this module, but it increases to 20.4% in
version 2.2.0. This is probably because Linux supports more and more similar device drivers
during this period.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presents a tool called CP-Miner 2 that uses data mining techniques to efficiently
identify copy-pasted code in large software including operating systems, and also detects
copy-paste related bugs. Specifically, it takes less than 20 minutes for CP-Miner to identify
190,000 and 150,000 copy-pasted segments that account for 20–22% of the source code in
Linux and FreeBSD. Moreover, CP-Miner has detected 28 and 23 copy-paste related bugs in
the latest versions of Linux and FreeBSD, respectively. Compared to CCFinder [KKI02], CP-
Miner finds 17–52% more copy-pasted segments because it can tolerate statement insertions
and modifications in copy-paste. In addition, we have shown some interesting characteristics
of copy-pasted codes in Linux and FreeBSD, including distribution of copy-paste across
2CP-Miner has already been released to the research community.
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different segment sizes, group sizes, granularity, modules, amount of modifications, and
software evolution.
Our results indicate that maintaining copy-pasted code would be very useful for pro-
grammers because it is commonly used in large software such as operating system code, and
it can easily introduce hard-to-detect bugs. We hope our study motivates software devel-
opment environments such as Microsoft Visual Studio to provide functionality to maintain
copy-pasted code and automatically detect copy-paste related bugs.
Even though CP-Miner focuses only on “forget-to-change” bugs caused by copy-paste,
copy-paste can introduce many other types of bugs. For example, after copy-paste operation,
the programmer forgets to add some statements that are specific to the new copy-pasted
segment. However, such bugs are hard to detect because it relies on semantic information.
It is impossible to guess what the programmer would want to insert or modify. Another
type of copy-paste related bugs is caused by programmers forgetting to fix a known bug
in all copy-pasted segments. They only fix one or two segments but forget to change it in
the others. Our tool CP-Miner can detect simple cases of this type of errors. But if the
fix is too complicated, CP-Miner would miss the bug because the modified code segment
becomes too different from the others to be identified as copy-paste. To solve this problem





This chapter will discuss the issues and limitations of the approaches proposed in this dis-
sertation and some possible solutions to address these issues in the future. It first presents
some existing issues in the general research area of applying data mining techniques for
software reliability, and then discusses the current limitations of PR-Miner and CP-Miner,
respectively.
6.1 Issues in Data Mining for Software Reliability
• Domain-specific knowledge. Although data mining can be applied to automation
of data analysis, it requires special domain-specific knowledge to solve problems. For
example, CP-Miner is based on how the programmers do copy-pasting in programming,
and therefore CP-Miner analyzes source code in lexical level and so it converts the
source code to the data fed to data mining algorithms. In contrast, since PR-Miner
analyzes the correlations among function elements (i.e. function calls, variables, data
types, etc.) which is syntax level information in source code, and therefore it converts
the source code to the data fed to data mining algorithms based on AST (abstract
syntax tree). In other words, in order to apply data mining techniques to solve software
reliability problem, some domain-specific knowledge about the problem is necessary.
An interesting question is whether we can further combine more domain-specific knowl-
edge to improve this approach. For example, some of the bugs reported by CP-Miner
and PR-Miner are false positives, and the programmers who wrote the programs may
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know the exact reasons why the detection tools report as false positives. One of the
solution is to collect and analyze the domain-specific knowledge provided by program-
mers. For example, programmers may annotate the source code where violates some
programming rules but it is correct, and when PR-Miner would know the exceptions
and would not report them as potential bugs. Further, programmers can verify the
bug reports and provide the feedbacks on true/false positives. Such feedbacks can be
used for future detection. For example, if a bug reported by CP-Miner is false positive,
bug signature can be calculated and applied to other bugs or future bug detection so
that CP-Miner would not report the potential bugs that match the bug signature.
• Incremental mining. Although it is efficient to using data mining to analyze source
code, it may not meet the requirement for practical usage if it requires to re-scan
all the source code in large applications every time. For example, some development
environment may check in source code every 30 minutes and apply automatic bug
detection before checking in. It is difficult to apply all the detection methods on the
whole millions of lines of code. However, the new or modified source code in each
check-in version usually contains less than thousands of lines of code. It there would
be no problem if we only need to analyze the new or modified source code each time. To
address this problem, we may apply incremental mining [CYH04, MPT03] to analyze
only the new data and update the existing patterns. For example, PR-Miner can build
the programming rules based on the existing source code, and update the rules when
some new source code is checked in. New programming rule may be inserted into the
rule database, and some obsolete rules may be also removed from the database.
6.2 Current Limitations in PR-Miner
While PR-Miner is very effectively in automatically extracting implicit programming rules
and detecting violations, our current version of PR-Miner has the following limitations, which
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could be future research.
• False negatives in rule extraction. PR-Miner may miss some programming pat-
terns due to the low supports of them, and so PR-Miner cannot find the corresponding
programming rules with low support. This problem is caused by the characteristics
of frequent pattern mining. In order to address this problem, we need to increase the
appearance of the real programming patterns. A possible solution is to combine with
dynamic analysis. We may collect the execution traces for correct runs, and then mine
the programming rules from the traces. Although the programming patterns appear
in source code for very few times, they may be on the frequent execution paths and so
the execution traces may contain many of the patterns.
Further, PR-Miner would miss some programming patterns if most of them cross func-
tions in source code. Because PR-Miner converts each function definition into one
itemset, if the programming elements in a pattern appear in different functions, the
corresponding tokens will appear in different itemsets and so the support would be
much lower than the actual support in source code. To address this problem, we may
also apply interprocedural analysis when we parse the source code. For example, we
may expand the the function call by inlining some function into the call sites.
• False negatives in violation detection due to copy-pasting. A violation to a pro-
gramming rule may be propagated to multiple modules due to copy-pasting [CYC+01,
LLMZ04], which would result in a lot of violations to the rule. As a result, PR-
Miner would probably miss to report this error. In order to eliminate the propagation
effect, we can combine with our previous work on copy-paste detection called CP-
Miner [LLMZ04], which also works with large software. Using CP-Miner, we can first
identify copy-pasted code, and then each group of copy-pasted code accounts as only
1 support in PR-Miner when extracting programming rules and detecting violations.
• Noisy effects of macros. Macro definitions in C can result in false programming
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rules as well as false negatives in detecting violations. Since GCC first preprocesses
the source code by expanding macros before creating the intermediate representation,
the information in a single macro can be duplicated for many times like copy-pasting.
Therefore, PR-Miner may report the elements in such a macro as a rule, and may also
fail reporting some violations in these macros since they are duplicated for many times.
In order to eliminate such noisy effects of macros, we can consider each macro as one
element using the technique in some other studies on refactoring [GJ03].
• Function name collisions. Since occasionally some functions use the same name
and PR-Miner only uses the compiling information from GCC front-end, PR-Miner
cannot differentiate them, which can result in false rules. Fortunately, in most software,
there are few identical function names especially in a single module, so it does not
cause too much trouble to PR-Miner. To eliminate this effect, we can use the linking
information when PR-Miner converts the source code to an itemset database so that
it can differentiate functions with identical names.
• False negatives in violation detection in some control paths. Since PR-Miner
uses function as the basic granularity for violation detection, it can miss violations in
some control paths. For example, if a rule appears in one of function F ’s control path,
PR-Miner would consider that the entire function F does not violate this rule, even
though some of its other control paths may violate this rule. To address this problem,
we can borrow techniques from model checking to check different control paths.
• Detecting specific types of programming rules and violations. The current
PR-Miner can extract the general types of programming rules from source code. As
we discussed in Section 6.1, it could improve performance of the approach if we could
combine domain-specific information. If we can provide some knowledge about some
specific types of programming rules and indicate PR-Miner to extract only of them
from source code, it can improve the accuracy and efficiency of PR-Miner. For example,
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instead of mining the correlations between any types of function calls and variables, PR-
Miner can identify the correlations among only the shared variables and lock/unlock
function calls, which may indicate the specific rules about which variables should be
protected by locks. Such a specific type of programming rules can be also applied to
violation detection and therefore it can detect a specific type of software bugs such as
data races.
The results in this dissertation indicate that PR-Miner is an efficient and practical tool to
extract implicit, undocumented programming rules and to detect violations in large software.
Furthermore, by replacing the GCC front-end parser, PR-Miner can be easily applied to
programs in other programming languages such as Java. In addition, we envisage extending
PR-Miner in several directions to address the limitations above in the current prototype.
6.3 Current Limitations in CP-Miner
• False negatives in copy-pasted code detection. Because CP-Miner tokenizes the
source code such as function names and variable names into numbers, some pieces of
code may appear similar but they are actually not copy-pasted. This issue can be dealt
with by keeping track of programmer’s editing actions, but not much development
environment provides such functionality and it cannot be applied to existing code.
Since the intention of programmer using copy-pasting is to reduce the effort in writing
code, it is not worthy to copy-pasting a piece of code if it involves a lot of editing
effort such modifying most of the code. To this end, we could reduce the false positive
rate by computing the editing distance between a pair of code segments. If the editing
distance is very large, it is probably a false positive.
• Other types of copy-paste related bugs. The current version of CP-Miner can
only detect one simple but common copy-paste related bugs, forget-to-change bugs. As
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the results presented in Chapter 5, copy-pasting can result in a lot of types of errors.
Another common errors is that when one bug is fixed in one copy of the copy-pasted
code, programmers may forget to fix the other copies. To detect such kind of bugs,
we can compare each copy of copy-pasted code, if there are some inconsistent changes




This chapter discusses some previous work related to the dissertation project.
7.1 Detecting Copy-Pasted Code
Several studies have been conducted on detection of copy-pasted code. The techniques
used include: line-by-line [Bak95], token-by-token [KKI02, PMP02], fingerprinting [Joh93],
visualization [CH93, DRD99], abstract syntax tree [BYM+98, KGD95], and dependence
graph [KH01, Kri01].
Dup [Bak95] finds all pairs of matching parameterized code fragments. A code fragment
matches another if both fragments are contiguous sequences of source lines with some consis-
tent identifier mapping scheme. Because this approach is line-based, it is sensitive to lexical
aspects like the presence or absence of new lines. In addition, it does not find non-contiguous
copy-pastes. CP-Miner does not have these shortcomings.
Johnson [Joh93] proposed using a fingerprinting algorithm on a substring of the source
code. In this algorithm, calculated signatures per line are compared in order to identify
matched substrings. As with line-based techniques, this approach is sensitive to minor
modifications made in copy-pasted code.
Some graphical tools were proposed to understand code similarities in different programs
(or in the same program) visually. Dotplots [CH93] of source code can be constructed by
tokenizing the code into lines and placing a dot in coordinates (i, j) on a 2-D graph, if
the ith input token matches jth input token. Similarly, Duploc [DRD99] provides a scatter
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plot visualization of copy-pastes (detected by string matching of lines) and also textual
reports that summarize all discovered sequences. Both Dotplots and Duploc only support
line granularity. In addition, they can only detect identical duplicates and do not tolerate
renaming, insertions, and deletions.
Baxter et al. [BYM+98] proposed a tool that transforms source code into abstract-syntax
trees (AST), and detects copy-paste by finding identical subtrees. Similar to other tools, it
is not tolerant to modifications in copy-pasted segments. In addition, it may introduce many
false positives because two code segments with the same syntax subtrees are not necessarily
copy-pastes.
Komondoor et al. [KH01] proposed using program dependence graph (PDG) and pro-
gram slicing to find isomorphic subgraphs and code duplication. Although this approach
is successful at identifying copies with reordered statements, its running time is very long.
For example, it takes 1.5 hours to analyze only 11,540 lines of source code from bison, much
slower than CP-Miner. Another slow PDG-based approach is found in [Kri01].
Mayrand et al. [MLM96] used an Intermediate Representation Language to characterize
each function in the source code and detect copy-pasted function bodies that have similar
metric values. This tool does not detect copy-paste at other granularity such as segment-
based copy-paste, which occurs more frequently than function-based copy-paste as shown in
our results.
Some copy-paste detection techniques are too coarse-grained to be useful for our purpose.
JPlag [PMP02], Moss [SWA03], and sif [Man94] are tools to find similar programs among
a given set. They have been commonly used to detect plagiarism. Most of them are not
suitable for detecting copy-pasted code in a single large program.
Kontogiannis et al. [KGD95] built an abstract pattern matching tool to identify probable
matches using Markov models. This approach does not find copy-pasted code. Instead, it
only measures similarity between two programs.
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7.2 Detecting Software Bugs
Many tools have been proposed for detecting software bugs. One approach is dynamic check-
ing that detects bugs during execution. Examples of dynamic tools include Purify [HJ92],
Valgrind [SNF+], DIDUCE [HL02], Eraser [SBN+97], and CCured [NMW02]. Dynamic tools
have more accurate information but may introduce overheads during execution. Moreover,
they can only find bugs on the execution paths. Most dynamic tools cannot detect bugs in
operating systems.
Another approach is to perform checks statically. Examples of this approach include
explicit model checking [ECC01, MPC+02, SD95, KTB+06b] and program analysis [CLL+02,
EA03, HCXE02]. Most static tools require significant involvement of programmers to write
specifications or annotate programs. But the advantage of static tools is that they add no
overhead during execution, and it can find bugs that may not occur in the common execution
paths. A few tools do not require annotations, but they focus on detecting different types
of bugs, instead of copy-paste related bugs.
Our tool, CP-Miner, is a static tool that can detect copy-paste related bugs, without
any annotation requirement from programmers. CP-Miner complements other bug detection
tools because it is based on a different observation: finding bugs caused by copy-paste. Some
copy-paste related bugs can be found by previous tools if they lead to buffer overflow or some
obvious memory corruption, but many of them, especially those semantic ones, cannot be
found by previous tools.
Our work is motivated by and related to Engler et al’s empirical analysis of operating sys-
tems errors [CYC+01]. Their study gave an overall error distribution and evolution analysis
in operating systems, and found that copy-paste is one of the major causes for bugs. Our
work presents a tool to detect copy-pasted code and related bugs in large software including




Automatically generating specifications has been studied for decades [Cap75, JHMW77,
Weg74]. Recently, Bensalem et al describe techniques for automatically generating auxil-
iary predicates, including the general reaffirmed invariants, invariant propagation, refined
strengthening, and invariant combination [BLS96]. Bjørner et al present the method to gen-
erate the auxiliary assertions by extending the traditional methods [BBM97]. Xie and Notkin
propose the approach of using inferred program semantic properties for test generation and
selection [XN03]. Ammons et al propose a machine learning approach to discovering specifi-
cations of the protocols that code must obey when interacting with an API or abstract data
type [ABL02]. These studies have different goals from PR-Miner.
In order to reduce programmers’ effort in manually writing specifications for the extended
static type checker (ESC) [FLL+02], a tool called Houdini has been developed [FL01]. Hou-
dini first derives the candidate annotations from the code using annotation templates, and
then removes the false annotations by combining ESC. Similar to Engler et al’s work, the
annotations derived by Houdini are limited by the templates and also require efforts from
programmers.
Dynamic invariant detection can extract specifications from programs’ dynamic execu-
tions [ECGN01, PE04]. Nimmer and Ernst investigated the relationship between dynamic
and static information, and showed that dynamical specification generation can capture some
non-trivial and useful semantic information [NE02a, NE02b]. They also justified that even
the unsound techniques can generate useful specifications, which validates our technique for
generating specifications by extracting implicit programming rules from source code.
7.4 Specification-based Checking
LCLint [EGHT94] is a light-weight static checker. Provided with the source code and the
specification written in the LCL language by programmers, LCLint reports inconsistencies
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between the code and specification. Taghdiri proposed a static analysis method to refine
specification for error detection [Tag04]. The user first provides a partial specification of
a procedure, and the specification is then iteratively refined via counterexample analysis.
Compared with these work, our PR-Miner extracts programming rules automatically.
7.5 Empirical Studies on Software Defects
Many efforts have been made to studying fault related characteristics of software systems [BP84,
CC00, CYC+01, FO00, LI92, Pau93, OWB05, SC92, VI84]. They show some important re-
sults and have thrown up some counter-intuitive findings. For example, Chandra et al. [CC00]
show that most bugs in release software are non-transient bugs, which is against the intuition
that transient bugs are more difficult to reproduce and hence to fix so that most bugs left in
release software should be transient. Another example in case is that Ostrand et al. [OW02]
found that majority post-release faults occurred in files that had no pre-release faults. This
observation contradicts the conventional wisdom that the best places to find bugs in re-
lease software are places that are faulty in pre-release. Therefore, most testing efforts for
post-release software should be put on previous fault-free or less-faulty parts instead of most
faulty parts.
Our work is different from previous work in two aspects. First, software system charac-
teristics have changed a lot due to various reasons as we discussed in Chapter 3. In addition,
most previous work focus on bug density related characteristics. On the other hand, we did
a more comprehensive study on bug characteristics in modern software. We not only classify
bugs according to their root causes, impacts, and other characteristics, but also analyze the
correlation between them.
Some recent studies have shown the promising benefits of machine learning techniques
for bug triage and diagnosis. Anvik et al. have applied machine learning techniques to
suggest a small number of developers suitable to resolve a bug report [AHM06, CM04].
119
Podgurski et al. proposed to cluster function call profiles from automated automated failure
reports [PLF+03]. Different from our study which is based on a large number of real-world
bug reports, they applied the classification techniques on profiles of failed executions, and
their clusters were used to prioritize software faults and to help diagnosis the causes.
Fault Prediction Bug characteristics and modification history learned from empirical
studies can be used to predict what modules are more fault-prone. Several models have been
developed on this [GKMS00, GMCS04, OWB05]. By identifying relevant source code from
change history, Ying et al. tried to predict the potential source code changes in a modification
task [YMNCC04]. Our study analyzes the correlations between root causes and impacts so
that our results can also provide developers useful clues to locate the possible root causes.
7.6 Open Source Software Systems
With the increasing deployment of OSS systems, the OSS has received more attention re-
cently. Due to the difference between the development of open source and closed source
software systems [CLM05, FF00, GT00], they also differ in various aspects of bug character-
istics.
Code quality is one of the major concerns for OSS. Mockus et al. analyzed defect density
and problem resolution intervals in two OSS projects [MFH00, MFH02]. Similarly, Paulson et
al. [PSE04] analyzed the evolutionary and static characteristics by comparing OSS systems
with closed source software systems. Both of them drew the same conclusion that OSS
systems have fewer defects since defects are found and fixed more rapidly. However, Stamelos
et al. assessed code quality in OSS using a measurement tool, and they found that the quality
is lower than that which is expected in industrial standard [SAOB02]. Our study is going to
further analyze the fixing time for different types of bugs so that the deeper insight can be
beneficial to software development and testing.
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Security issue is another big concern in OSS systems [Cow03, Pay02], since OSS gives
both attackers and defenders a good opportunity to exploit software vulnerability, which
means defenders should put more effort and response the the security holes more quickly.
In our study, we are going to show the major causes for security issues in OSS so that the
results can guide development considering security. To improve security of OSS systems,
several security-enhancing techniques, including software auditing, vulnerability mitigation
and behavior management, are addressed by Cowan [Cow03].
7.7 Bug Benchmark
Bug benchmark is a standard to evaluate bug detection tools, but there is no widely-accepted
benchmark suite yet. Most of the existing benchmarks are not representative for the cur-
rent situation in software development. Some related benchmark suites such as Siemen
benchmark suite [HR] and PEST benchmark suite [JMN] contain only a few types of bugs,
most of which are semantic bugs, only few memory-related bugs and no multi-threading
bugs. Some benchmarks such as the multi-threading program benchmarks proposed in IBM
Haifa [HSU03] are based on artificial bugs instead of real ones. Recently, we have proposed a
preliminary bug benchmark, BugBench [LLQ+05]. BugBench summarizes the general guide-
lines on the criteria for selecting representative bug benchmarks, and it contains around
twenty various types of software bugs from real applications. Our study of bug characteris-
tics in modern software can further give the guidance on how to choose representative bugs
as the suite candidates.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In order to improve software reliability, this dissertation proposes a novel approach that
applies data mining techniques to extract useful information from large software including
source code and documents, and illustrates how to apply such information to bug charac-
teristic study and bug detection. Specifically, this dissertation studies bug characteristics by
investigating a large number of bug reports using text classification and information retrieval
techniques, and proposes two bug detection methods, including CP-Miner that detects copy-
pasted code and related bugs, and PR-Miner that extracts application-specific programming
rules and detects violations that indicate potential bugs.
This dissertation demonstrates that data mining techniques are efficient and effective to
analyze large software, which also indicates that data mining techniques are promising and
practical in analyzing large system datasets such as source code and development documents.
To understand the characteristics of software bugs, this dissertation investigates the im-
pacts of new factors on software bugs and studies the bug characteristics in two large modern
OSS projects. Using text classification and information retrieval techniques, this studies au-
tomatically classifies tens of thousands of bugs and verifies the analysis results from sampled
datasets so that the results can be more representative on bug trend and complexity of fix-
ing. This study classifies bugs from three different dimensions, namely, root causes, impacts
and software components, and further analyzes the correlation among categories in different
dimensions. Furthermore, this study also analyzes the trends of different types of bugs and
the difficulty of fixing them based on the large dataset from automatic classification. This
study found several new interesting bug characteristics in modern OSS that can provide
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useful guidelines for related research.
This empirical study shows that the major cause of software bugs are application-
specific and they can also have severe impact on system reliability as memory related bugs.
Application-specific knowledge such as specification is needed in order to detect such se-
mantic bugs. However, such information is usually not well documented by programmers
manually especially in large software.
To extract such information automatically, this dissertation proposes PR-Miner that uses
frequent itemset mining to efficiently and automatically extract implicit programming rules
and detect violations with little efforts from programmers. The rules extracted by PR-
Miner are in general forms, including both simple pair-wise rules and complex ones with
multiple elements of different types. The evaluation results show that PR-Miner can extract
thousands of closed programming rules within seconds. In addition, PR-Miner has detected
many violations to the extracted rules, and many of them have been confirmed as real
bugs. Most of these bugs violate complex application-specific rules that contain more than 2
elements and are thereby difficult to be detected by previous tools. The results indicate that
PR-Miner is an efficient and practical tool to extract implicit, undocumented programming
rules and to detect violations in large software code.
Furthermore, this dissertation proposes an approach called CP-Miner that uses frequent
sequence mining to efficiently identify copy-pasted code in large software including operating
systems, and also detects copy-paste related bugs. It takes less than 20 minutes for CP-Miner
to identify 190,000 and 150,000 copy-pasted segments that account for 20–22% of the source
code in Linux and FreeBSD. Moreover, CP-Miner has detected 28 and 23 copy-paste related
bugs in the latest versions of Linux and FreeBSD, respectively. In addition, the results show
some interesting characteristics of copy-pasted codes in Linux and FreeBSD. The results
indicate that maintaining copy-pasted code would be very useful for programmers because
it is commonly used in large software, and it is prone to introducing hard-to-detect bugs.
This dissertation has shown that data mining techniques are promising and effective for
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improving software reliability by analyzing a large amount of data including source code and
development documents. However, many problems are still open as the future work.
One of the problems is what other types of information can be also analyzed by data
mining techniques to improve software reliability. Very recently some studies has shown that
patches to software bugs also contain useful information for bug detection [KPW06]. Besides
patches, can data mining techniques be applied to some other data sources such as execution
traces to improve software reliability?
Another problem is how to apply incremental mining techniques for software reliability.
Although this study has shown that data mining techniques is efficient for static analysis, it
still requires further efficiency improvement if the approaches are deployed as online services
(e.g. scanning the new checked-in source code). Therefore, incremental mining techniques
could be a desirable solution.
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